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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Companies have been allowing remote access to the end users for years to provide 
access to the corporate resources. Remote access needs for end users has been 
evolved ever since it has been technically possible to arrange. First, it was introduced 
for maintenance purposes only and afterwards for end users, but with technology-
dependent solutions and limited support and functionalities. Later on, more user-
friendly solutions have been evolved with standardized protocols, like IPsec (IP Secu-
rity Architecture) using VPN (Virtual Private Network) technology. Traditionally, this 
has been arranged by using corporate devices, which is usually a laptop, configuring 
the remote access using the technology that the corporate provides and signing a 
contract or a remote access policy. Corporate IT manages and supports remote ac-
cess service and has the total responsibility. This traditional way of doing remote 
access is still very common in today’s business.  
 
For the past years there has been a great deal of discussion about BYOD (Bring Your 
Own Device) for another method of remote access. There are also several acronyms 
for similar usage, such as CYOD (Choose Your Own Device), HYOD (Here is Your Own 
Device), OYOD (On Your Own Device) and BYODT (Bring Your Own Device and Tech-
nology). The differences between these terms are so insignificant (JGRSC, 2013) that 
we can talk about BYODT to refer all of these methods except HYOD. HYOD is similar 
to traditional way of doing remote access where corporate has total control of de-
vice, access and data and has total responsibility and support of the concept. All the 
other acronyms refer to the model, where neither end user nor corporate has total 
control of the device, access or data and neither party shares the total responsibility 
or support. Instead, all of them are shared between the end user and the company. 
 
 BYODT will provide flexibility to the user when certain job-related functions can be 
done remotely with one’s own, familiar device, instead of a corporate device, but 
this also introduces risks if not done securely. The same end user’s device now shares 
the job-related data and personal data, which both have different kind of data classi-
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fication and retention. Additional security needs to be in place, to address risks that 
the end user’s device and data expose when it is outside corporate premises and 
especially in personal use, since corporate data usually have more strict data classifi-
cation criteria than a user’s personal data. Security adds complexity since the net-
work connection and the user’s device needs to be secured. Increased security also 
decreases usability and user-friendliness. Increased security means that user authen-
tication and Need-to-Know or Least Privilege must be in place to meet the security 
demands for remote access defined by the corporate itself to protect its data. Lever-
aging BYODT in corporate environment is a direct consequence of Consumerization 
of IT. BYODT devices were first designed for consumers’ use and therefore their secu-
rity features were slightly different than devices designed for corporate use. Today, 
they are more mature and security and manageability features will meet the corpo-
rate demands on many mobile platforms. BYODT devices have become more and 
more common in corporate environments worldwide. 
 
1.1 Scope 
 
Building a remote access that is easy enough for the users, secured from end-to-end 
and not too complicated to manage, is challenging. This is the case, because increas-
ing security affects the end user experience and ease of use negatively. Also, bigger 
environment and multiple solutions create more complexity and maintenance tasks. 
So far, companies have built up their IT infrastructure with devices that usually do 
one or few purposes or services only. As the services has been expanded over the 
years, the number of devices has been increased, which creates more complexity and 
administration tasks. The scope of this research is to leverage the functionalities in 
Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) so that many of those purposes and services can 
be replaced with one single device, which would be seen as more simplified envi-
ronment and without degradation of security, performance and latency. In addition, 
better overall security visibility and easier maintenance tasks can be achieved. The 
scope will be limited to one NGFW product and two remote access solutions. One 
remote access solution is based on BYODT method and another based on traditional 
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remote access method. Remote access devices will be Samsung’s phone with An-
droid Operating System (OS), Apple’s iPAD with iOS and a laptop with Windows 7. 
 
1.2 The Objective of the Research 
 
The objective of this research is functional testing of Next-Generation Firewall 
(NGFW) to find out if NGFW can support traditional remote access method and 
BYODT technologies at the same time without compromising IT Security and in order 
to achieve better visibility of IT related risks. The objective also includes finding out if 
NGFW environment can simplify traditional network infrastructure. The research 
method was empirical research for the functionality tests of NGFW product and liter-
ature research for BYOD and NGFW solutions. The research questions were: 
 
- Do NGFW functionalities work as expected? 
- Can traditional remote access and BYODT Technologies be supported with on-
ly one (logical) NGFW device? 
- Can the IT Environment be simplified using NGFW? 
- Can security still be measured and not degraded with NGFW? 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter two introduces the backgrounds of the perimeter network evolution in the 
companies for the past years and the existing literature of BYOD models and re-
searches. It also introduces some NGFW surveys and some implementation examples 
and surveys. Even though NGFWs has existed since 2005, and many companies have 
implemented them in their environments, not so many implementation researches 
have been made or are publicly available. 
 
Chapter three introduces a traditional way of implementing perimeter security and 
remote access, as well as a theory for implementing and replacing the traditional 
network perimeter including remote access system with NGFW solution. Architectur-
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al differences between traditional network devices and Palo Alto Networks NGFW 
device are also introduced. 
 
Chapter four presents the testing environment, testing plan and tested functionali-
ties with different platforms. The results are presented in chapter five. 
 
The final chapter is chapter six, which presents conclusions and discussion about the 
thesis and answers the research questions with areas of further research. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Evolution of IT Organization 
 
Companies’ network and infrastructure has been growing and becoming more com-
plicated in the 2000s and afterwards especially in medium-sized and large compa-
nies. There are many reasons for this concerning business itself and the consequenc-
es effecting IT infrastructure and services directly. Business itself expands, collabo-
rates and changes constantly and sometimes rapidly, which means that the IT infra-
structure and services must adapt to the changes as well. Since business changes 
always have possibilities and threats, they will affect the IT and therefore these 
changes have also an effect on the infrastructure. In the early 2000 IT Department 
was driven by CFO (Chief Financial Officer) or CIO (Chief Information Officer) and IT 
expenses were more constant and predictable. In the mid of 2000, new positions 
were introduced, like CSO (Chief Security Officer), CISO (Chief Information Security 
Officer) CRO (Chief Risk Officer) and CRMO (Chief Risk Management Officer). Organi-
zation hierarchies changed to become more complex and governance and bureau-
cracy increased. In the late 2000, PMO (Project Management Office) was already 
introduced in many companies and took responsibility of project management, pro-
ject portfolios and processes was designed to be more productive. IT department, 
among others, was starting to utilize SD (Service Desk) and ticketing systems to han-
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dle dependencies among systems, projects and incidents. Reporting became more 
important to mid-level managers and follow-up of expenses was started, Service 
Levels were agreed to services and SLAs (Service Level Agreements) with partner, 
including contracts and sanctions. Partners and consultants were more utilized, since 
systems became complicated and SME’s (System Matter Experts) were more often 
needed to trouble-shoot problems and incidents. Then Cloud-Based Services and 
virtualization were introduced and got immediate interest because they offered a 
variety of services with low cost expectations. This contributed to outsourcing of IT 
Services partially or most of the services and even different partners, which created 
more fragmentation and inefficiencies. That is because information must reach all 
parties and collaboration and teamwork must work seamlessly over the company 
borders. At the same time, application landscape started to move towards more 
browser-based form and started to shift from internal networks to the internet and 
some of them were encrypted. The total landscape of the network and security was 
fragmented over the years and maintaining systems became more complicated, since 
more parties and administrators were involved. 
 
A Centralized Management System and Network Monitoring System were needed to 
manage changes and monitor network and events and to increase response times. 
Also, SIEM (Security Incident and Event Management) was needed to handle the 
great amount of events and log entries to intelligently filter only essential infor-
mation. However, the outsourced IT Services were not always able to be monitored, 
at least on a satisfied level. Internal and independent audits and regulation compli-
ances were paid more attention to. When organizational and technical landscape 
changed rapidly sometimes into even different directions, business alignment suf-
fered resulting in poor operability of the IT services.  Today, business changes are 
best controlled and managed in the management level with top-to-bottom approach 
which should eventually affect the operational level. Thus, active and utilitarian or-
ganization hierarchy, right key-persons, encouraging and recognizing atmosphere, 
strong cooperation between departments and training are key elements to success-
fully handle changes throughout organization in reasonable timeframe. COBIT5 (Con-
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trol Objectives for Information and Related Technology) can be a helpful framework 
for enterprises to plan, implement and maintain security for remote devices includ-
ing BYODT. Operational level problems and solutions includes technology and archi-
tectural point of view which can be handled with the right training of skilled staff 
with effective practices and processes with bottom-to-top approach, which requires 
good communication skills in management level. 
 
2.2 Evolution of Internet-related Threats 
 
In addition to business related changes, IT related changes have increased more rap-
idly after 2000 and it seems to be an ongoing trend today. Increased threats towards 
a variety of applications and different operating systems have become more com-
mon today than in early 2000s. Vulnerabilities are discovered in almost all applica-
tions and platforms so rapidly that there is barely enough time to patch them before 
new vulnerabilities are discovered. Unwanted programs, like malware, trojans and 
viruses that exploit vulnerabilities are published more rapidly than in early 2000s. For 
the past years, APT (Advanced Persistent Threats) and targeted attacks has taken 
place for more sophisticated electronic espionage and spying of government or com-
pany secrets. Unwanted programs are not created by individuals or groups anymore, 
since they have become extremely sophisticated and organized by entities that have 
capability and means to produce ones (Mandiant, 2013, The Guardian 2013). These 
all are commonly used to refer as cyber threats, which have been raised by one of 
the largest concerns almost in every business (Lloyd’s, 2013). People’s behavior has 
also changed since past years. Today, Social Media and Web 2.0 play a more signifi-
cant part in people’s life, and Social Media itself introduces risks and vulnerabilities 
that need to be addressed by the company, since companies’ resources are used to 
access Social Media, and Social Media, in turn, can be used to gain information of 
company users and to conduct targeted attacks. This behavior has also changed the 
remote access thinking. Consumerization of IT has introduced the BYODT approach, 
which indeed will introduce threats to the remote access environment. The funda-
11 
 
 
mental feature of BYODT is that a user and company share the same device and data. 
The device is user’s property and data is divided into user’s personal data and com-
pany’s data, which both usually have different kind of data classification and reten-
tion. This is the major difference between traditional remote access and BYODT and 
it generates the most significant concerns between these two methods. 
 
2.3 Evolution of Network Perimeter 
 
In early 2000, every company had a FW (FireWall) in the border of the network and 
every workstation and server had antivirus (AV) programs to address unwanted pro-
grams, which was considered a satisfactory combination at that time. The FW filters 
traffic based on the ports and protocols that the administrator had configured, usual-
ly allowing business related traffic to communicate between internal and DMZ (De-
Militarized Zone) networks and denying traffic from the internet. The AV program 
inspects the files in the clients and servers for unwanted software just to make sure 
nothing gets past the firewall or out-of-band threats, such as files from CD-ROM and 
USB drives to name some. Then, gateway level protection was a new technology that 
was becoming a more common solution to gain layered protection to email and un-
encrypted www-traffic in addition to AV protection in end points. Yet, they both 
based on different AV vendors, instead of a new technology solution.  
 
In the mid of 2000, IDS/IPS (Intrusion Detection System/Intrusion Prevention System) 
solution was introduced. HIDS (Host-based Intrusion Detection System) and NIDS 
(Network-based Intrusion Detection System) as well as HIPS (Host-based Intrusion 
Prevention System) and NIPS (Network-based Intrusion Prevention System) was in-
troduced by different security- and AV vendors. Where IDS could detect the threat or 
attack IPS could prevent it, since IDS was only monitoring traffic and anomalies, 
whereas IPS was connected in-line to have the ability to reset the connection when 
anomalies where detected. So, in-line topology needs to be built as fault-tolerance to 
prevent SPFs (Single point of Failure) in the network. To address SPFs, a LB (Load Bal-
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ancers) was commonly used to balance traffic loads to two or more devices. Soon 
after IDS/IPS technologies, UTM (Universal Threat Management) was introduced. 
UTM was the first try to implement all or most of the previously mentioned technol-
ogies into one box to lower down the device complexity and costs, especially in the 
branch offices. However, when all those technologies and numerous functionalities 
are put into one device to the hardware that is not built to do that, the latency and 
performance will collapse. Another consequence was also that the functionalities 
had to be greatly reduced, since one box can have only a limited amount of configu-
rations and features with the hardware used at that time. That is the main reason 
why UTM products are not so common today.  
 
At this point, in the late 2000, centralized logging and monitoring was introduced to 
handle incidents and events from a variety of sources and platforms. Network proto-
cols, like SNMP, SYSLOG and Netflow were used. Since the amount of logs increased 
and was hard to manage, intelligence was needed and SIEM was a solution to filter 
out and correlate many log entries to fewer meaningful alarms or alerts. The latest 
innovation is the NGFW product, and the first NGFW product shipped out at 2007. 
NGFWs continued what UTM could not handle. The only way doing it was to build 
the hardware completely all over again. With purpose-built hardware, NGFWs could 
take the challenge of implementing many services into one box without any or only 
minor latency and performance degradation. Some of the innovations were applica-
tion identification based on behavior regardless of the evasion tactics, identifying 
users regardless of IP address, scanning the content to address targeted attacks and 
data leakage and introducing sandbox technology based on cloud-based or private 
platform. 
 
2.4 BYOD Surveys 
 
Utilization of BYOD technologies in the classroom introduced positive learning at-
mosphere, according to a literature research in Michigan University (Vanwelsenaers 
2012, 22-23). It also improved student engagement, interaction with peers and 
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communication and extended the place and time of learning. If these opportunities 
can be achieved in the student society by supporting BYOD technologies, then there 
is potential to enable them by using BYOD in working life as well. Any technology 
solution or other method that is supporting productivity and positive learning at-
mosphere is most likely worth of investment, since a happy, innovated and motivat-
ed employee is the most productive employee. Of course BYOD includes risks that 
cannot be forgotten and needs careful considerations before implementation. The 
whole lifecycle of BYOD technologies needs to be considered at the first place. There 
were eight key findings in a research by Educause Center for Applied Research for 
The Consumerization of Technology and the BYOE Era of Higher Education (Dahl-
strom & diFilipo, 2013, 4-5, 37): 
 
1. Unmanaged proliferation of devices could result in a situation, where too 
many devices access campus networks too fast and institutions find more op-
portunities lost than taken 
2. IT leaders express support for BYOE to promote happy and productive faculty 
and staff 
3. Doing before planning is actually the norm – yet policies are in place where 
they matter most, such as security and end-user behaviors 
4. Security practices should be invested in managing risks and raising user 
awareness 
5. BYOE cost savings can be elusive with the cost to upgrade IT infrastructure 
6. IT infrastructure should be considered as a BYOD middleware, which should 
be robust and nimble at the same time 
7. Support strategies need to consider the lag between BYOE ubiquity and do-it-
yourself support and therefore adapt to BYOE environments 
8. Utilizing mobile technologies is a priority, but how to best do so, remains un-
common. 
 
The recommendations included that one should not count on savings, but if any, 
then invest on infrastructure. It also estimates that user-provisioned technologies 
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will proliferate and they do very little to change the basic best practices in security. 
Data and access to the data should be secured rather than devices and more collabo-
ration should be done inside organization not forgetting user-awareness. (Dahlstrom 
& diFilipo, 2013, 4-5, 37). Investing in the infrastructure is far-reaching and many 
security features do not differ so much from the current solutions that companies 
already have, however people’s behaviors are more difficult to affect. Although this 
research has been in the higher education institutes and among students and teach-
ers, there is still valuable information and experience for companies to develop, since 
students who practiced with BYOD will be (and already are) in the working life. There 
is competition of good employee in the industry in every field. 
 
According to a research of University of Oregon, Competitive advantage and cost-
savings are factors when developing BYOD Strategy in Higher Education (Emery, 
2012, 90-97). It also states that IT policy needs to be more specific than traditional IT 
policy to address data network security and the control over it. BYOD policy needs to 
be designed in collaboration with users and “IT must educate user as to the dangers 
and limitations of using their personal devices at work” (Emery, 2012, 91). A factor to 
consider related to data security was found that “a competitive edge promised by 
mobility can be wasted if consumer-owned mobile devices are not adequately pro-
tected against mobile device security threats” (Emery, 2012, 94).  Appropriate safe-
guards were to implement an access control based on user identification, device type 
and access type or location and leveraging the six factors: segregation of data, device 
registration, remote access to a mobile device, data encryption, strong passwords 
and VPN.  (Emery, 2012, 90-97.) The importance of policies cannot be overstated, 
since users must be familiar with policies and acceptable behaviors with BYOD devic-
es. Infrastructure is easier to upgrade and manage. If BYOD is being used prior to 
policies and appropriate procedures, then it is much more difficult and time consum-
ing to try to change behaviors and attitudes when users are already familiar with 
their own usage which may not be the correct way of accessing, using and distrib-
uting corporate data. 
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A research was made by Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research   
about BYOD for 88 respondents in different kind of business sectors like IT, Consul-
tancy, educational institutes and others. Since 88 respondents out of 136 samples 
were aware of BYOD policy, only 88 were taken into consideration for data analysis 
and interpretation. It concluded that 45 % of respondents agreed that BYOD is lucra-
tive for the organization and only 4 % fully disagree with this view. It also revealed 
that if BYOD has some threats and risks, few of the advantages overshadowed its 
risks and most of the respondents felt that BYOD should be still applied in the organi-
zations; however with definitely some security measures. 45% of respondents named 
Corporate IT Security as the major threat of BYOD, the second was Lack of control 
over devices and the third was Complexity of set up. (Nisharika, 2012, 7-10.) 45% of 
BYOD users feel that supporting BYOD technologies is lucrative, but 35% of the users 
does not even know that a BYOD policy exists. User-awareness and education needs 
to be taken care of continually and with several methods to achieve the best possible 
coverage among end users. If the device is the property of end user, as it usually is in 
BYOD solutions, then the end user is most likely more motivated and concerned with 
security threats and countermeasures. Contractual liabilities in the policies are also 
one motivation factor with end users commitments. 
 
Nucleus Research made a research of “Understanding the Hard ROI of BYOD” in April 
2013. It states that companies must consider six major areas in understanding ROI of 
BYOD: Device costs, voice and data costs, helpdesk costs, mobile developer costs, 
enterprise mobility management software and the productivity obtained specifically 
through personally-owned devices. Device costs are only a small fraction of the total 
costs of enterprise mobility. “Voice and data costs reimbursement above 40$ per 
month implies a company is deliberately giving up money to support BYOD”. Help 
Desk costs vary depending on the outsourcing model. For example, for one employee 
to device support for every 1000 devices is 5$ per month when Tier 1 (basic settings 
and device support) is moved to IT Help Desk and Tier 2 (advanced trouble-shooting, 
mobile applications and other mobile problems) is outsourced. But depending on the 
organization, this can vary 50$ per month. Fully-loaded cost of a mobile developer 
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was estimated to be at 150,000$ yearly. This can lead to significant benefits, includ-
ing increased productivity. Mobility management methods must protect corporate 
data in compliance-based market to avoid potential liability issues, regardless of cor-
porate or personal ownership. If an employee needs a specific technology to do their 
work effectively, the business should invest in that technology; however if the value 
of mobile technology cannot justify a corporate investment, then why does the em-
ployee need it at all. The major winners of BYOD are Telecom Carriers from the fi-
nancial perspective and the losers are the ones that are supporting technology strat-
egy and those responsible for risk and compliance in the companies. (Nucleus Re-
search, 2013.) Intangible or indirect costs are hard to calculate, such as ROI of BYOD 
or productivity, however practices also vary in every company, country and culture. 
But if the productivity increases, the potential can be huge and yet hard to calculate. 
Therefore it can be challenging to justify this for decision makers who want to see 
cost-effect solutions and savings instead of estimates that cannot be based on facts 
or cannot even calculated with any accuracy. Personalities and relationships have a 
major role between decision making level and CIO. Direct costs like infrastructure 
costs, including maintenance costs and license costs, are easier to calculate. 
 
A thesis made by Viitamäki at Metropolia of “Aruba BYOD or Citrix VDI as Solution for 
Multinational Enterprise” (Viitamäki, 2013, 25-26, 46-47), points out that if applica-
tion or virtual desktop is not designed for touch screens, it is not realistic to assume 
that it would be user-friendly. This is the case, when serving Windows based applica-
tion or virtual desktops to iPads or iPhones without separate key boards. They are 
also prone to network problems, like all real-time applications. Citrix installation was 
multistage and Citrix licenses were found opaque since users and Windows servers 
needed to be licensed separately. Citrix was found to be secure, since information is 
not saved on end users’ device, instead in the corporate resources. ClearPass’ chal-
lenges were found to be complex roles and policies which may effect to complex 
rollout. 802.1X support is a prerequisite for the company’s routers and switches prior 
to rollout. The design of the network is essential in ClearPass’ case and the rollout 
needs the most design work than installations. (Viitamäki, 2013, 25-26, 46-47.) 
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Choosing the right technology solution is essential, since it plays a major role in every 
environment. Therefore, companies need to compare different solutions in their 
needs to verify that the solution and the support chain operate as expected and it is 
customizable and scalable for 3-5 years’ needs, including BYOD solutions and tech-
nologies. 
 
Gartner, the world’s leading information technology research and advisory company, 
predicts that by 2017, half of the employers will require employees to supply their 
own device for work purposes and enterprises that offer only corporate-liable pro-
grams will soon be the exception. This may take place in the USA, however the rest 
of the world will follow subsequently. (Gartner, 2013.) This estimate is in line with 
Check Point’s survey. It sponsored a global survey conducted by Dimensional Re-
search of 790 IT professionals in the USA, Canada, UK, Germany and Japan. The result 
was that BYOD is growing dramatically in enterprises of all size and the BYOD move-
ment has dramatically increased the expensive security incidents. Some of the key 
findings were also, that 79% of the companies reported security incidents in the past 
year and 52% of large companies reported costs of mobile security incidents last year 
exceeded $500, 000. 45% of businesses with less than 1000 employees reported 
costs exceeding $100,000. Half of the respondents cited that Android perceived with 
greatest security risk compared to other platforms and 66% stated that a careless 
employee is a greater security risk than cybercriminals. 63% of the responded com-
panies do not manage corporate information on personal devices at all. (Dimensional 
Research, 2013.) BYOD technologies will be more common in near future and prepar-
ing infrastructure, people and policies will take time. It is expensive to choose not to 
manage data or mobile devices, when some of the most common risks are realized. 
 
ISACA (Information Systems Audit and Control Association), an independent, non-
profit and global association, conducted a survey at November 2012 for more than 
4,500 of its members in 83 countries, including 980 members in Europe. The results 
of the IT Risk/Reward Barometer show slowly growing acceptance of BYOD in the 
workplace. In Europe 28% of organizations freely allowed personal mobile devices for 
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work, in North America 34%, Africa 38% and Oceania 48%. There was a 20-percent-
point drop in enterprises that prohibit BYOD down from 58% to 38%, in Europe. The 
survey also revealed that enterprises will lose on average 12,000 euros in productivi-
ty due to an employee shopping online during work hours in November and Decem-
ber, according to nearly quarter of those surveyed. A quarter also believes that em-
ployees will spend more than a full work day shopping online during work hours us-
ing personal computer or smartphone. (ISACA, 2012.) 
 
According to ISACA’s 2012 IT Risk/Reward barometer, Globally in Europe, Africa, 
Canada, North and Latin America, India and Australia and New Zealand, top three 
security controls were found to be needed in every organization: 
 
 A password management system 
 Remote wipe capability 
 Encryption 
 
They all share another similarity: enterprises still do not have a security policy in 
place for BYOD. It seems that BYOD has generalized more rapidly among users than 
administrative operations and it has been dismounted somewhat uncontrolled in the 
organizations. Bureaucracy like policy changes and approvals cannot take too much 
time since BYOD may spread uncontrolled in the organization meanwhile. This would 
introduce potentially great risks to the organization, since it is most likely unaware of 
the situation. The following employee activities were seen to pose a particularly high 
risk to the enterprise: 
 
 Storing work passwords on a personal device 
 Losing work-supplied computer or a smart phone 
 Using an online file-sharing service for work documents 
 Downloading personal files onto a work-supplied device 
 
19 
 
 
When in Europe and Africa BYOD was cautiously accepted, Canadians were more 
allowing despite the concerns of BYOD related risks. In Latin American BYOD was 
seen increasingly risky and the Indians were remained wary, since almost half of the 
enterprises prohibit BYOD. Australia and New Zealand, on the other hand, have 
growing acceptance of BYOD. (ISACA, 2012). Online shopping was predicted to in-
crease in the future and especially in the holiday seasons. Online shopping was seen 
to increase IT risks in every continent. (ISACA, 2010, 2011.) There are similarities in 
every continent concerning BYOD and its risks. Therefore it is possible to implement 
solutions, technologies and policies to adapt BYOD usage, even in multi-cultural, 
global enterprises. Local exceptions may need to be done in order to support global 
policies and standards inside the company. Reasons can be legislations, size or loca-
tion of the branch offices, criticality or sensitivity of the location or the local know-
how (or absence of it) that plays a significant role in the wholeness. Handling of secu-
rity incidents must be managed rapidly and effectively, since IT security threats tends 
to transform towards Advanced Targeted Threats which are harder to detect. 
 
A survey made by ISACA of APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) Awareness Study at 
2012 from 1,551 individuals results that 87.3% of respondents think that BYOD com-
bining with rooting or jailbreaking makes a successful APT attack more likely. It also 
reveals that antivirus, anti-malware and traditional network perimeter are the most 
used technologies to thwart APTs, instead of many defensive approaches. Also, 
53.4% of respondents believe that APTs do not differ from traditional threats and 
one in five enterprises have experienced an APT attack. (ISACA, 2012.) If there is no 
understanding in the companies, how APTs differ from traditional threats, then it 
explains why no additional actions have not been taken into account and why com-
panies stick to the traditional countermeasures – and usually fail to detect or prevent 
APTs. 
 
It is clear that young generation adapts new technology more naturally and effective-
ly because they have already adopted new technology at the very early stage. In ad-
dition, more institutes and schools are leveraging BYODT or similar technologies. 
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Thus, supporting BYODT kind of technologies could be a far-reaching investment for 
corporates, since new generation will already be familiar with new technology when 
entering the work life, while the older generation will be minority. Since the new 
generation interacts with social media and new technology in their daily life, it could 
be a good strategy for companies with low middle age to start shifting towards 
BYOD. It has been seen that office hours and outside office hours are not so precise 
anymore depending somewhat on the job description. Work can be done at a differ-
ent time of the day or night or even in one’s personal time, regardless of the office 
location or need to be physically in the office. So, there may be benefits to mix per-
sonal and business time by leveraging BYODT. Even personnel would spend time on 
work hours with personal issues, like shopping online they would probably work 
equally or more outside working hours. These kinds of individuals will likely gain the 
most out of BYODT. 
 
It is hard to make comprehensive and somewhat accurate estimation of BYOD ROIs, 
productivities or intangible costs, because there are just so many uncertainties and 
pieces of expenses which all effects to the total cost of BYOD, such as roaming costs, 
domestic data and voice costs. Globally increasing traffic amount drives telecom car-
riers to upgrade their infrastructure which will eventually increase data costs for end 
users and companies. If the company pays, reimburses or owns the end user’s voice 
and data interface, the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card, this will be a consider-
able part of the mobile costs for a company. Security controls and threat counter-
measures for the end user device, communication path and the gateways needs to 
be planned for BYOD, including logging, monitoring, capacity planning and AAA (Au-
thentication, Authorization and Accounting). If the existing remote access method 
company is currently using, does not provide sufficient capabilities, then these will 
cause costs in terms of increased license costs and possible hardware and support 
costs. Then, there is human factors concerning personnel, and how will they choose 
to adapt BYOD in real-life and is it implemented correctly, is it still usable in the us-
er’s point of view and can they access applications they need today and in the near 
future? And if they can, are they developed for touch screen and smartphone use. 
21 
 
 
 
BYODT is not so different if compared to partners, support or 3rd party remote access 
to corporate resources. Companies have typically implemented VPN solution, SSL-
VPN access or Citrix solution for a partner’s remote connection. Whichever solution 
is used, it is most likely the same solution as the company’s own remote users have. 
Partners have always had their own workstations for remote access and only in rare 
cases a company provides them a company workstation. This is a BYOD model, since 
partners have total control of their own devices and a company can only authenti-
cate the 3rd party users and limit their network access and of course log and monitor 
their actions. Partners have their own policies to follow in addition to other company 
policies, remote agreements, NDAs and contracts with other companies. These con-
tractual procedures in administrative level have been the only possible controlling 
method, since device control in operational level is the responsibility of the partner.  
 
2.5 NGFW Surveys 
 
Using only traditional FWs in the border of the network has not been sufficient for at 
least ten years anymore. AV has also been seen inefficient to detect new malware 
and variants not only because of encryption, polymorphism and metamorphism be-
havior of viruses, but also the exponentially rising speed of new variants (Rissanen, 
2012).  Functionalities provided by NGFW solutions have been implemented more 
and more, to address these kinds of threats that traditional FW cannot detect (Os-
terman Research, 2013). Osterman Research conducted a survey for 209 organiza-
tions, 106 from United States and Canada and 103 from EU (UK, France and Germa-
ny). Survey was about NGFW management adoption and practices in medium- to 
large-size organizations in different industries. 19% of North American companies 
and 17% European reported that majority of their FWs are NGFWs and during the 
next 12 month 44% US’ and 47% EUs responded expect the majority of their infra-
structures to be NGFWs. The primary reasons were to improve their protection 
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against complex threats, limit access to internal and external applications, and im-
prove network performance, see Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Reasons to move from traditional FW to NGFW (Osterman Research,  
                   2012, 5) 
 
93% of the organizations use/plan to use IPS module of their NGFW and 62% in ac-
tive prevention mode. The key functionalities used or anticipated by organizations 
adopting NGFW are illustrated in Figure 2. Standard firewall capabilities will remain 
after migration because of backward compatibility, but their existence will be minori-
ty after migration, since more and more enhanced functionalities, like application 
identification, IPS, user group mappings and content and threat prevention capabili-
ties will be used to replace traditional capabilities. 
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FIGURE 2. NGFW capabilities adopted or anticipated by companies (Osterman  
                   Research, 2012, 8) 
 
Migration from traditional FW to NGFW is a big step because of enhanced features 
that will replace the traditional method and that will apply to the production controls 
of the traffic. For example, traditionally allowing HTTP would allow almost every sin-
gle application that used TCP port 80. In NGFW with application identification, the 
company needs to know what application will be allowed through 80 or regardless of 
the port, as long as it is HTTP traffic. Thus, after implementation there are dozens of 
applications that needs to be permitted in order to get them replaced if compared to 
the traditional method. For example, Adobe has 11 different application characteris-
tics. “adobe-connect” will permit all the three characteristics of adobe connect appli-
cation and allowing only “adobe-meeting” would allow only adobe-meeting func-
tionalities, without any file transfer or remote control functionality, see Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Application identification characteristics for Adobe Connect 
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Other similar applications using HTTP are numerous such as, dropbox, google’s appli-
cations and features, FTP, facebook, twitter, webex etc. All of these NFGW capabili-
ties (including application identification) can be seen in Figure 4 with the following 
characteristics:  
 
 Validating the correct operation of next-gen firewalls 
 Planning the architecture changes to minimize impact on operations 
 Creating new, more granular policies based on applications, users, content 
types 
 Converting traditional firewall configurations to the new NGFW configura-
tions 
 Changing processes related to auditing, change management, reporting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. Migration characteristics to consider when migrating to NGFW (Osterman 
                   Research, 2012, 10) 
 
After migration, the management of the NGFW is somewhat similar to traditional 
FW, however the control methods will be different from the traditional ones. Figure 
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5 illustrates the distribution of the top three challenges in on-going management of 
NGFW. In Europe NGFWs are more used to control an internal application than in 
Noth America (Figure 1). North America uses traditional FW simultaneously with 
NGFW more than in Europe (Figure 5) and also for troubleshooting time is spent 
more than Europe. Troubleshooting connectivity issues seem to be less challenging in 
Europe than in North America, while training administrators on a new firewall plat-
form and concepts are ranked as almost similar challenges in Europe and North 
America (Figure 4). The survey also summarizes, that in Europe FW changes per 
month are twice more than in North American organizations, 273 vs. 123. All of this 
could indicate that in Europe, there are more trained and educated IT personnel than 
in North America. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5. Top three challenges in on-going management of NGFW (Osterman  
                   Research, 2012, 12) 
 
3,056 Enterprises worldwide have used Palo Alto’s NGFW during May 2012 and De-
cember 2012 and an Application Usage and Risk Report have been generated from 
that data by Palo Alto Networks (Palo Alto Networks, 2013). The data included 12.6 
petabytes of data, 1,395 applications with 5,300 unique critical, high and medium 
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severity threats. No survey was made, only raw data was collected from live traffic. 
Key findings were as follows: 
 
 Applications that are commonly viewed as top threats are not. That is be-
cause 339 social networking, video and filesharing applications represent 20% 
of the bandwidth; however, displayed only 0.4% of the threat log. Exploits 
were commonly detected in social networking by ratio of 49:1 and Facebook’s 
3rd party applications and widgets were 228 times greater in number than 
other social media applications. FTP and WebDAV represented the highest 
number of filesharing threat (mostly exploits) logs and were the 4th and 6th 
most heavily used filesharing application. 
 
 Out of 1,395 applications found, only 10 were responsible for 97% of all ex-
ploit logs observed and out of 10 applications, 9 are internal applications and 
represented 82% of the exploit logs. Exploits focused on the internal applica-
tions, like database, active directory, RPC etc. 
 
 
 Malware relies on custom applications, since custom or unknown UDP traffic 
represented 55% of all malware traffic and was the number one type of traffic 
associated with the malware communication (Figure 6). Leading malware 
families continue to customize their command-and-control traffic; however, 
in contrast, exploits were only a small percentage of custom/unknown traffic. 
 
 Encrypted traffic, SSL, represented 5% of all bandwidth and the 6th highest 
volume of malware logs within known applications. It was used primarily on 
command-and-control traffic. Total application count that used SSL in some 
way was 356 and 85 out of them did not use standard SSL ports, instead most 
of them used port hopping, the second most TCP/80 (for HTTP) and 3rd  other 
ports than default, TCP/443. HTTP proxy was the 7th highest volume of mal-
ware logs. 
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Unknown or custom traffic exists in every organization, typically in range of 8-10% of 
all traffic. It can be an internally developed application, a not yet identified commer-
cial application or a threat. It presents a low volume of traffic but high volume of risk. 
It is significant for enterprises for determining and then managing a small volume but 
high risk traffic for controlling threats. This is because attackers and their malware 
will usually customize existing applications and protocols to fit the attacker’s needs. 
While unknown/custom-UDP and TCP traffic is the largest part of malware logs, 
malware also masks itself to more traditional paths, such as DNS, IRC, SSL and Web-
Proxies. Custom traffic was observed in use in variety of very popular malware fami-
lies including: Zero Access Botnet, Conficker, The Poison Ivy RAT and the IMDDOS 
denial of Service Botnet. Web-Browsing, DNS and SSL were the top three, which have 
both the most frequency of use and volume with the highest concentration of mal-
ware logs. And when viewed in tandem with malware data they are found commonly 
and can utilize any port. (Palo Alto Networks, 2013, 3-5, 11, 13-14.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6. Applications with the highest concentration of malware logs (Palo Alto 
                   Networks, 2013, 13) 
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Exploits in custom traffic were a small percentage, but 83% of them were classified 
as critical and the remaining 17% as either high or medium. Critical exploits are the 
most dangerous ones, since they can take near total control of the system by infect-
ing the target with malware as part of ongoing persistent attack. The majority of the 
exploits used in custom traffic was targeting IIS web-servers, SQL databases or were 
used in cross-site scripting attacks. (Palo Alto Networks, 2013, 14-15.) 
 
Most of the vulnerabilities of internal applications (97%) were found only by 10 ap-
plications out of 1,395. And 9 out of these 10 applications are considered as internal 
applications or infrastructure applications that internal applications are highly de-
pendent on and they are all high-value assets. This indicates that critical resources 
attacked from inside the network continue to be the rule of the attacking strategy 
and not the exception. Therefore, enterprises need to monitor the internal networks 
for threats in addition to perimeter security and monitoring, see Figure 7. (Palo Alto 
Networks, 2013, 11.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7. Top 10 applications based on criticality (Palo Alto Networks, 2013, 11) 
 
A summary of the report can be seen as a figure in the Appendix 1. 
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Palo Alto Networks analyzed more than 1,000 real-world enterprise networks for 3 
months. The focus was on 26,000 malware samples that were completely undetect-
ed by 6 fully updated enterprise AV products at the time they were found in the cus-
tomer networks. Key findings were:  
 
 94% of unknown malware was delivered via web browsing or proxies 
  It took 20 days for traditional AV to deliver coverage for malware for web 
and 5 days for email.  
 
The analysis showed that 70% of unknown malware had indicators in the payload or 
traffic that can be used to improve protections. The indicators were as follows: 
 
 40% of malware can be blocked with payload-based signatures, if delivered in 
time 
 30% of malware generates unknown traffic, which can be blocked, if un-
known traffic is blocked 
 30% of malware traffic can be blocked, if concerned files or traffic to or from 
fast-flux domains or newly registered domains or DNS servers 
 
The most common technique to avoid end-point security was for the malware to 
sleep a long period of time to avoid analysis. More sophisticated behavior focused on 
disabling security measures and internal checks within the operating systems. (Palo 
Alto Networks, 2013b.) 
 
By replacing traditional technology solutions, like IDS/IPS, Proxy + ICAP integrated AV 
and URL Filtering solution and VPN GW/SSL-VPN to one NGFW solution, potential 
benefits are numerous. Many of them are intangible like reduced license costs, sup-
port costs and less hidden dependencies between security devices, smaller latencies 
and better performances without capacity or resource bottlenecks. The outcome can 
be less troubles and problems and less time is spent trouble-shooting and therefore 
more time is available to the efficient working. There are also significant advantages 
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in administration tasks, like simplified network topology and lesser devices to admin-
ister, backup and configuring tasks. Also, more security features and controls can be 
used in almost any kind of combination to gain more advanced control over the traf-
fic with wider security monitoring in a single system. Gaining knowledge of the con-
tent of the internal network’s data in addition to perimeter data is utmost important. 
Comprehensive monitoring includes applications usage combined with threats and 
risks monitoring. (Laine, 2012.) 
 
31 
 
 
3 THEORY OF REPLACING THE SERVICES 
 
3.1 Traditional way of doing Remote Access 
 
Figure 8 illustrates a typical medium- and large sized IT infrastructure in the border of 
the network. Black arrows illustrate the flow of events and logs generated by the 
device or administrator. Client location varies between the LAN and the internet. 
Traditionally, VPN technology is used when client location is on the internet and it is 
common also that VPN connection is established by the user. Then, during VPN con-
nection attempt, authentication occurs by challenging the user a userid and pass-
word request and then possible two-factor authentication follows. Userid with pass-
word and/or two-factor authentication combination can be also replaced by a smart 
card or certificates, but the userid and password combination is the most used 
method, because it is the simplest and cheapest one to use – and the most insecure, 
if used alone. After successful authentication, the connection is established and job-
related work can start. If there is any personal-related work that the user would like 
to do, then the company policy will define what can be done and what is prohibited. 
 
Usually, when a VPN connection is terminated, the internet access is useless for per-
sonal work, since the corporate security settings prevents any other connections, 
except VPN connection to the company’s VPN gateway. Therefore personal comput-
er based usage is separated from company issued computers to the personal com-
puters. Remote access built solely with traditional technology holds one significant 
challenge that should be addressed. Once the user or partner establishes a remote 
access connection and connects to a remote server to the company’s internal or DMZ 
network, security measures should be in place to prevent leapfrogging from server to 
server. This is a challenge with traditional technology, since application identification 
and user identification in different servers through remote access connection are not 
achieved easily. It is challenging to identify different sessions generated by the same 
user from different client and servers because user identification information is not 
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transferred within different sessions and protocols. Therefore, traditional network 
technology cannot address this problem easily, because it cannot differentiate users’ 
sessions from each other if they are coming from the same server, for example. User 
identification is essential, since a policy can be tied to the user’s identity and usually 
requirements are quite the same for the user regardless of the access method, loca-
tion or even the device. The traditional method has never had to address external 
MDM (Mobile Device Management) solution, since end devices have always been 
under corporate IT department and support has been provided by IT support systems 
already in place, like Microsoft Windows Server Update Services (WSUS), System 
Center Configuration Manager (SCCM), remote desktop software (like Netop or 
DameWare) or some other 3rd party product. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8. High-level design of traditional perimeter network 
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3.2 Traditional way of doing BYOD 
 
Introducing BYOD into traditional kind of network infrastructure will cause IT de-
partment to face real challenges, since the traditional model does not support BYOD 
in any way. If there is no real application identification, user identification and end-
device identification in place, then there is a missing control in place. For partner’s 
remote connection BYOD has been working because of limited number of partners, 
limited connections needs and some additional contractual procedures. But still 
there are caveats, such as preventing effectively leapfrogging in a technical way can 
even prohibited in contracts. Using traditional control methods to BYOD environ-
ment limits the controlling BYOD. Since there are many ways to use BYOD and tradi-
tional control methods are limited, based only on port or protocol restrictions and 
user authentication, a comprehensive BYOD environment may not be achieved with 
this combination. Even MDM does not help much, since it only controls device set-
tings, however it does not control traffic. 
 
3.3 Remote Access and BYOD with NGFW 
 
Figure 9 illustrates a traditional network perimeter with red circles and dotted line 
red circles. Red circles illustrate services and devices that can be completely replaced 
by NGFW and dotted line circles illustrates partially or completely replaced services, 
depending on the company’s current setting. 
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FIGURE 9. Overlapping services and devices between traditional FW and NGFW 
 
IDS/IPS systems can be replaced completely depending on how complex these rules 
are. For IDS and not too complex IPS configuration, both can be completely replaced 
with NGFW. Since NGFW and IDS/IPS are a bit different technology they are not 
100% comparable, but the same features are found in both devices. Load balancers 
cannot be replaced at all, since NGFW does not include load balancer. However, if 
load balancers are for network perimeter devices only, and network devices are 
completely replaced, they are left unused and can be therefore terminated. If they 
are used for servers or other services in addition to network perimeter devices, they 
cannot be completely replaced, but instead moved to another zone, perhaps closer 
to the servers. 
 
Proxies are used for user authentication, group mapping, content filtering, AV inte-
gration, logging and alerting, caching the content, restricting access, content rewrit-
ing, SSL decryption and encryption and similar purposes. The only feature that can-
not be replaced in proxy server is cache service. Since internet has become more and 
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more dynamic, encrypted and password-protected, the significance of a cache has 
become less important, since proxy server cannot cache those features. Thus, in 
many cases proxy server including AV integration can be completely replaced. NGFW 
will completely replace traditional FW and remote access services run by VPN Client 
or VPN LAN2LAN solution, or any other IPsec functionality. If remote access has been 
implemented using SSL-VPN solution, it cannot be replaced. SSL-VPN offers features 
for HTTP and HTTPS services and some authentication features for browsers, but 
these can be replaced with application identification and user identification in 
NGFW. A company should balance benefits and costs between SSL-VPN versus VPN 
with NGFW to avoid double costs for similar services in the environment. 
 
After implementation, high-level design can be seen as illustrated in Figure 10. Using 
the functionalities in NGFW will enable more advanced control of the traffic, based 
on application or application filters, user or user groups, time and date or recurring 
time or date, threat or content, HIP (Host Information Profile) and it also controls 
BYOD technologies in addition to traditional technologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 10. Traditional FW solution replaced by NGFW solution 
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Replacing FW with NGFW introduces also some application installations. There are so 
called User-ID Agent and Terminal Services Agent. User-ID Agent functionalities can 
also be carried out with the firewall itself, which polls for AD (active directory)’s DC 
(domain controller)’s security logs to notice any user authentications in the AD envi-
ronment. This information is then replicated to the NGFW, which now knows the 
User’s IP address, userid and AD group memberships. This information can be used in 
the security policies. Terminal Services Agent does the same for MS Terminal Ser-
vices and Citrix Metaframe Presentations Servers. When there are multiple users 
logged in, it distinguishes the user’s sessions each other. This information is also rep-
licated to the NGFW and used in the security policies. This is an effective technical 
countermeasure against leapfrogging. Similar User-ID functionalities can be done to 
MS Exchange environment to once again to feed the information to NGFW. This is 
effortless solution to identify users that cannot be found anywhere in the domain, 
such as users using personal devices to access corporate email system directly from 
the internet. 
 
As soon as NGFW has been installed, the WildFire functionality should be enabled to 
compare the defined traffic between company and the internet with wildfire to gain 
extra security and to get the latest updates from the WildFire. This can be as fast as 
with 15 minutes interval, if using WildFire license. Without a license WildFire is still 
available, but updates are pushed from the Palo Alto network approximately once a 
day. WildFire license includes a capability to feed information to the WildFire Cloud 
Services from different servers/services, like company mail gateways, to the wildfire. 
This feature leverages xml API (Application Programming Interface) in the NGFW. The 
server/service sends the hash of the file to the Wildfire and if the hash has been seen 
before by the WildFire, then the information is already known and replicated back to 
the NGFW. If it has not been seen, then the file is sent to the WildFire to get the 
feedback of its behavior, whether benign or malware. Then, the update is available 
not only to the company itself, but all the other customers as well. This way, the 
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“WildFire community” protects itself by sharing the protection information to gain 
extra security. 
 
3.4 Architectural Differences between Traditional FWs and NGFWs 
 
Traditional FireWall technology was implemented more than 20 years ago. It has 
evolved from packet filtering to stateful Inspection FireWall and today they include 
Content Inspection Capabilities, such as IDS/IPS features, signatures for malicious 
traffic behavior and viruses. The functionalities have evolved during the years, but 
the most important feature has not; the architecture.  
 
The traditional FireWall architecture consists of the hardware components and the 
core software inside the Central Processing Unit (CPU). The only change in the plat-
form is that the server hardware has changed to higher performance hardware and 
some of them with efficient Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) circuits. 
When the processing is done with the hardware, it is always more efficient than by 
software with the CPU.  However, the industry standard and general-purpose pro-
cessors are not sufficient anymore, which affects the processing capacity negatively, 
because they cannot process the traffic more than a small minority of packets trav-
ersing the device at a time (Metzler, 2007, 1-2).  
 
The traditional FireWalls are based on stateful inspection, which means that they 
identify traffic based on the state of the connection. The attributes that form the 
state of the session includes source and destination port, protocol, source and desti-
nation IP addresses and the sequence numbers. The most CPU-intensive task is the 
start of the session and traditional FireWalls identify and classify the traffic by the 
start of the session information including the port and protocol information, not by 
inspecting the content of the packets (Metzler, 2007, 1). The less-intensive task for 
CPU is to check whether a packet belongs to an existing session or not. After the ses-
sion is initialized by the CPU, the session is established and the rest of the packets of 
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the same session will be processed with hardware and only minimum need of the 
CPU’s time is needed. 
 
Because all of the Content Inspection Capabilities that requires deep packet inspec-
tion are done in the CPU, the overall performance collapses when the traffic increas-
es, since more content are inspected. This is the reason why all the traditional Fire-
Walls struggles to process CPU-intensive traffic with deep packet inspection turned 
on, with any accuracy of guaranteed performance. It also affects to all of the remain-
ing traffic, because the degradation in performance causes delays to all traffic trav-
ersing through the FireWall, not just the content inspected traffic. VoIP is one exam-
ple of latency-critical application that suffers if network latency is varying too much. 
 
This CPU processing problem has been tried to circumvent by creating a specialized 
blades or dedicated expansion modules for existing hardware to provide CPU inten-
sive tasks with additional CPU processing unit. It may be temporary solution, but only 
postpone the inevitable: traditional technology will need to redevelop in order to 
manage the continually growing traffic amounts and to detect and prevent advanced 
threats in the traffic. In order to address both, the architecture needs to be different 
to face the traffic amounts and the internal logic needs to be redeveloped to detect 
the behavior of the traffic and address application and threats accordingly. The tradi-
tional way of inspecting the start of the session information only, is not sufficient 
anymore. It takes more than just the initialization phase to correctly identify the ap-
plication, since application can change the port ranges or do other range of functions 
over a single connection (Metzler, 2007, 2). 
 
This architectural problem lead to the situation where the whole implementation 
and architecture needed to redesigned in order to achieve real performance im-
provements. This means special-purpose programmable hardware in the platform 
and identifying correctly the application traversing the firewall, which both have a 
big role in the architecture. They also need to have ability to create custom applica-
tions, track port-hopping and dynamic ports and look over the IP header information 
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into the payload of the packet to look for identifiers (Metzler, 2007, 4). They also 
need to perform SSL decryption/re-encryption, segregate application functionalities 
(e.g. facebook-apps, facebook-chat, webex-chat, webex-file-sharing etc.), identify 
users and tie events and traffic to them and create reports and alerts – all of this at 
multigigabit throughput (Metzler, 2007, 4). In addition, it cannot be too complex for 
inputting a rule set or analyzing it for a HelpDesk level analyst (Metzler, 2007, 4). 
 
The advantage of application identification is that it prevents forged applications to 
traverse through the NGFW, but also unnecessary load of IPS module, since only al-
lowed and correctly behaved applications are passed to the IPS module, instead of all 
traffic. In addition to application identification, if the architecture is also built on lay-
er 7 in the Open System Interconnect (OSI) model, then the result is more powerful 
than layer 4-based architecture. The application layer is in layer 7 in OSI model and 
stateful inspection features are in layer 4. If the architecture relies on layer 4 and has 
added features (modules) for layer 7, the combined results usually show in poor per-
formance and visibility (Palo Alto, 2010, 11). 
 
Table 1 summarizes the features between Palo Alto Networks architecture and tradi-
tional FW architecture. 
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TABLE 1. Differences between Palo Alto Networks and UTM or IPS-based products 
                 (Palo Alto, 2010b, 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Single pass architecture means a common decoder protocol engine for scanning all 
traffic. Decoding engine pick apart application stream to separate different pieces of 
the application; start and stop of the file, posting data versus downloading data and 
were a command is executed. Scanning engine uses this information to scan the con-
tent of the files, data, threats and URLs. Since this is the most processing-intensive 
task, it is done only once by using single pass architecture, see Figure 11 (Palo Alto, 
2008, 6). 
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FIGURE 11. Palo Alto Networks single pass architecture (Palo Alto, 2008, 6) 
 
Another difference between Palo Alto architecture and traditional architecture is a 
stream-based signature engine. This component replaces a file proxy for data, virus 
and spyware, a signature engine for vulnerability exploits and an HTTP decoder for 
URL filtering. This single component has the benefit of real-time scanning and only 
reassembles the small minor of packets when needed, without the need of down-
loading the entire file in order to scan it. And second, scanning happens only once, 
instead of multiple times, like traditional technology does (Palo Alto, 2008, 6). 
 
Traditional technology processes the content multiple times, as illustrated in Figure 
12 in worst case scenario, where multiple hardware and software are used to per-
form the same tasks that single pass architecture model does in the Palo Alto archi-
tecture. In multi-task architecture, CPU-intensive tasks, e.g. file proxies, application 
decoding, signature engines and policy enforcement are processed separately, which 
generates processing overhead, latency introduction and throughput degradation 
(Palo Alto, 2008, 9). 
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FIGURE 12. Existing solutions multi-pass architecture (Palo Alto, 2008, 9) 
 
In multi-pass architecture, the processing is divided into different engines and con-
tent scanning features are proxying files. Therefore, the hardware acceleration is 
impossible to achieve. Another challenge is the architecture that does not allow to 
add content scanning with hardware accelerated afterwards, instead of implemented 
in the architecture and software into the platform (Palo Alto, 2008, 8). 
 
Palo Alto Networks does the hardware acceleration by the platform for the following 
functionality blocks: 
 
 Networking; Packet routing, flow lookup, stats counting, NAT and similar 
functions 
 User-ID, App-ID and policy engine in multicore security processor for encryp-
tion, decryption and decompression 
 Content-ID; signature lookup 
 control plane; Management functionalities, logging and reporting 
 
These blocks are illustrated in Figure 13 for data plane and control plane. 
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FIGURE 13. Palo Alto Networks platform architecture (Palo Alto, 2008, 8) 
 
There are benefits and trade-offs when changing proxy-based scanning to stream-
based scanning. Benefits are: 
 
 Scalability; Stream-based scanning requires significantly less memory and 
processing power, because it does not need to store the entire file prior to 
scanning. Therefore it’s more feasible for scanning large files 
 Low latency; stream-based engine forwards the file as it receives it, which is 
the fastest way of scanning content 
 Common processing; stream-based scanning can process all traffic with one 
processing engine, whereas file proxy cannot scan vulnerabilities and there-
fore requires multi-scan approach. 
 
Trade-offs: 
 
 Blocking viruses, spyware or data over traditional email protocols like SMTP 
cannot be done. Blocking infected attachments will often cause a continuous 
retransmission of the attachment over SMTP. In addition, it is not possible to 
quarantine the email message 
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 Compression operates only for zip and gzip formats without password protec-
tion. That is, because these are the only two compression formats that com-
press in blocks of data instead of the entire file as compressed blocks. How-
ever, these are the most common compression algorithms and file type scan-
ning can be used to monitor or block from traversing certain network seg-
ments. 
 
Benefits are more significant than trade-offs, because the outcome is quaranteed 
throughput with increased operational performance, even in multi-gigabit speed 
(Palo Alto, 2008, 8). 
 
NSS Labs is the world’s leading independent information security research and test-
ing organization. Its expert analyses provide unbiased data for information technolo-
gy professionals in companies that they need to select the right product for their 
companies. According to NSS Labs’ Networks Intrusion Prevention Systems individual 
product test results for Palo Alto Networks NGFW model PA-4020 at August 2010, 
PA-4020 blocked 56,6% of attacks for “out-of-the-box” or default configuration and 
with rapid tuning that consisted of three settings in the policy by Palo Alto Networks 
engineer, the effectiveness improved to 93,4%. The throughput was informed as 
2,000 Mbps of inspected traffic but it was verified to be 2,259 Mbps with “Real 
World” protocol mix traffic. It also provided an outstanding 3-year Total Cost of 
Ownership (TCO) including labor. 3-year TCO was calculated as $80,450 and price per 
Mbps-protected was $38. (NSS Labs, 2010, 1). 
 
At April 2011, the same test was done again to the same model by the NSS Labs. This 
time the throughput was measured 5,207 Mbps, 3-year TCO was calculated $53,825 
and price per Mbps-protected was only $10. The TCP split handshake spoofing test 
failed at the first test, but a software update was done and it was verified by NSS 
Labs to pass the test at the second time. All the other tests were successful at the 
first try (NSS Labs, 2011, 14). Even the test organization was the same the test meth-
odology versions were different in both tests and the PAN-OS version was also dif-
45 
 
 
ferent, which may explain the variation in the test results. At 2012 NSS Labs made a 
Next-Generation FireWall Group Tests to seven vendors, which only two earned 
“recommended” rating and Palo Alto’s model PA-5020 was one of them. It passed all 
the resistance to evasion tests with Methodology Version 4.0, except HTTP evasion, 
which resisted only 33% of evasion attempts (NSS Labs, 2012, 8). Table 2 illustrates 
the individual test results. 
 
Table 2. Resistance to evasion (NSS Labs, 2012, 8) 
 
 
 
 
 
NSS Labs stated “Palo Alto Networks has acknowledged this issue and a public fix 
should be deployed by the time this report published” (NSS Labs, 2012, 8). The HTTP 
obfuscation is listed more detailed in Table 3, which shows that they are all codec 
(encoding) obfuscations. 
 
Table 3. HTTP obfuscation with PA-5020 (NSS Labs, 2012, 24) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The throughput for 2,000 Mbps device was measured 3,805 Mbps with inspection 
on, but the connection rates was considered low for a 3,8 Gbps device. However, 
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connection settings are set for a 2 Gbps device, where the connection rates are ap-
propriate. (NSS Labs, 2012, “). 
 
NSS Labs made a Next-generation Firewall Comparative Analysis at 2013 and the re-
sults were published at February 26th. The testing methodology was NSS Labs’ Next-
Generation FireWall Methodology version 5.2. It stated that 8 out of the 9 products 
scored over 90% for security effectiveness, while only half of tested vendors scored 
90% in this category at 2012. The overall scores for security effectiveness in 2013 
ranged from 34.2% to 98.5% compared to 18% to 98.9% in 2012. Also, only 2 of 9 
products tested had throughput rates that were significantly less than their vendor’s 
stated claims, while in 2012 5 of the 8 products tested performed well below their 
advertised speeds. TCO remained fairly stable. Most tested devices costs below $44 
per protected-Mbps. The overall range in 2013 was $18 - $124 per protected-Mbps, 
while in 2012 it was $30 - $375 (NSS Labs, 2013).  
 
Top scores for Security Effectiveness and Overall Protection were given to Check 
Point by NSS Labs at 2013. Test result show that Check Point’s Next-Generation 
FireWall solution provides the best out-of-the-box protection in the industry (Check 
Point, 2013, 1). See the NGFW Security Value Map in Figure 14. Out-of-the-box 
means default settings or minimal configuration for the device before connected into 
production environment. All security devices require additional configuration, when 
deployment is for large or mid-sized company. Most of the cases existing FireWall’s 
configuration is transferred to the new FireWall. 
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FIGURE 14. 2013 Security Value Map (Check Point, 2013, 1) 
 
According to Security Value Map, most of the other vendors have achieved Palo Alto 
Networks’ head start within the past year, since many of them are in the upper right 
corner and they are equal or even better position. The essential is to choose from the 
vendors in the upper right corner, whose differences are relative small. If the security 
is the only feature that matter, then Check Point or Sourcefire would be the best so-
lution to choose from, since they provide the best Security Value. However, they can 
change places at the next test. If the benefits brought by the new architectural solu-
tion matters in addition to security, then Palo Alto would be the best solution at the 
small expense of security effectiveness and TCO. 
 
While Check Point has the best Security Value Map, the architecture still matters. 
According to Check Points’ Software Blade Architecture: Achieving the right balance 
between security and protection and investment: 
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The architecture also delivers a high level of flexibility without sacrificing 
performance. Security gateway performance can be guaranteed when 
multiple blades are deployed by enabling performance thresholds. 
Thresholds, set by IT personnel, control the provisioning of system re-
sources—such as CPU cycles and system memory—to the IPS Software 
Blade. (Check Point, 2013, 7). 
 
Figure 15 illustrates this functionality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 15. Setting usage tresholds to quarantee performance 
 
In the higher resource load, the security gateway either suddenly will suffer perfor-
mance degradation and stops handling traffic or stops inspecting the traffic until re-
sources are at defined level again. This way, a DoS attack could be used to disable IPS 
feature and inject malicious traffic into the network. Another more likely example is 
no more than a normal heavy load in the environment, such as backup system or 
another bandwidth consuming application that can do the same thing and cause un-
necessary risk by disabling IPS inspection. This affect to the Security Value Map nega-
tively, depending how long the resources are overloaded. It also causes degradation 
in latencies and throughput by filling up Device’s TCP buffers, which will end up 
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packet losses to all the traffic passing the device, since the traffic that cannot fit into 
the buffers will be discarded. 
 
Even there are unbiased companies that test the functionalities with different kind of 
test methods, they provide results that are not the same as in the real-life environ-
ments. But testing the equipment in controlled environment gives the advantage to 
make comparative analyses between the devices in the exact same situation and in 
the exact same way. However, the reality is still different and they cannot be easily 
verified in the lab environment. 
 
Gartner defines the NGFWs as follows: 
 
Next-generation firewalls (NGFWs) are deep-packet inspection firewalls 
that move beyond port/protocol inspection and blocking to add applica-
tion-level inspection, intrusion prevention, and bringing intelligence 
from outside the firewall. An NGFW should not be confused with a 
stand-alone network intrusion prevention system (IPS), which includes a 
commodity or nonenterprise firewall, or a firewall and IPS in the same 
appliance that are not closely integrated. (Gartner, IT Glossary). 
 
According to Gartner’s Magic Quadrant for Enterprise Network Firewalls 2013, Palo 
Alto Networks has a design advantage of “single pass” technology including applica-
tion identification and IPS features throughout the inspection stream. Competitors, 
instead, have separate modules forming a serial order processing; from FireWall to 
IPS and then to the application control (Gartner, 2013). Figure 16 illustrates the situa-
tion of network enterprise Firewall market in 2011. Palo Alto Networks has taken the 
place of visionary, whereas the biggest competitor Check Point Software Technolo-
gies is the leader. 
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FIGURE 16. Magic Quadrant for Enterprise Network Firewalls 2011 (Gartner, 2011, 1) 
 
When compared to the 2013 statistics, Palo Alto Networks has established its place 
in visionaries within only in the past few years, headed towards to the upper right 
corner to the leaders and visionaries. At the same time, the biggest competitor Check 
Point Software Technologies is still the leader but moving towards the challengers, 
see Figure 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 17. Magic Quadrant for Enterprise Network Firewalls 2013 (Gartner, 2013, 2) 
 
Palo Alto Network represents the only vendor in the market that has completely re-
designed and rebuilt its product and has also gained the strongest position in the 
network firewall market. All the other vendors are still built on the traditional Fire-
Wall technology solutions. 
 
3.5 MDM (Mobile Device Management) 
 
MDM Solutions is excluded from this thesis, but it is worthwhile to mention that 
MDM solution is an absolute solution before starting to implement any BYOD solu-
tion. MDM can force settings to mobile devices and therefore not only facilitates, but 
also secures the remote access devices at implementation and change management 
stages as well as throughout the whole life cycle of a mobile device.  
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4 EMPIRICAL STUDY: TESTING THE FUNCTIONALITIES 
 
4.1 Testing Environment and Equipment 
 
NGFW vendor was chosen to be Palo Alto Next-Generation Firewall, since it is the 
only vendor that has not built on traditional hardware technology with serial order 
processing, instead it is purpose-build hardware with single pass architecture (Gart-
ner, 2013). Palo Alto Next-Generation Firewall model is PA-200, with the most cur-
rent software image and with full license capabilities: Threat Prevention, URL Filter-
ing with Brightcloud and Pan-DB, Global Protect Portal + Subscription + Gateway Li-
cense and WildFire Subscription.  Mobile devices will be Apple iPAD, Samsung Galaxy 
SII (Android) and Windows 7 Pro laptop, all of them with the most current Global 
Protect software image. Wireless Access Point (AP) will be Aruba RAP-3 and WAN 
router is A-Link RR24 and both with the latest software image, see Figure 18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 18. Testing environment 
 
Global Protect for Android version: 1.3.2 
Android version: 4.1.2, Phone: Samsung Galaxy SII, GT-I9100 
Global Protect for Windows version: 1.2.4, 1.2.5 and 1.2.6 
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Windows version: Windows 7 Professional with SP1 
Global Protect for Apple iPad version: 1.3.1 
iPAD version: iOS 6.1.3 
Pan-OS versions for PA-200: 5.0.4, 5.0.5, 5.0.6, 5.07, 5.08 
Aruba RAP-3WN Wireless AP: Version: 6.1.3.4-3.1.0.2_36584 
ADSL Router A-Link RR24: Software: 3.7.1 and firmware: 845_AVK_020907.02FA 
 
Some of the functionalities will be tested using NCC’s Palo Alto NGFW 5000-series, 
with version 5.0.x. This is, because some features need a greater amount of real-life 
data samples that cannot be generated in the lab environment easily, or because of 
special custom application existence and real-life behavior. Tested functionalities 
were Custom Application functionality, Threat Profiles, some of the Reports, WildFire 
statistics and pre-logon feature on VPN functionality. 
 
4.2 Test Plan and Tested Functionalities 
 
Tested functionalities for all mobile devices: 
 
 Global Protect Portal and Gateway (location aware VPN) with user-logon, on-
demand and pre-logon modes 
 Built-in VPN client provided the mobile device’s OS 
 SSL-Decryption/Encryption 
 Application identification and usage in the policy 
 QoS (Quality of Service) filtering 
 Geographical location usage 
 HIP (Host Identification Profile) for identifying end device 
 Threat identification (virus, malware, vulnerabilities, web categories, data fil-
tering, WildFire) 
 Reporting functionalities for WildFire and custom reports 
 Custom application 
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 Software and dynamic updates 
 
At first, the PA-200 NGFW was configured with all the features listed above. Internal 
network was created with DHCP pool in the NGFW. WAN network was created with 
obtaining interface IP address via DHCP from the ADSL Router, as well as DNS set-
tings provide by the ISP. All IP addresses in the NGFW were private addresses, includ-
ing WAN interface. Zones were created for Internal (named as Koti), Internet (named 
as ADSL) and VPN Zone (named as VPN). Threat Detection and WildFire functionality 
was configured to all traffic by default. NAT was created for outbound traffic from 
internal networks and another NAT for outbound traffic from VPN zone to separate 
the NATted traffic from each other in the logs. Global Protect Portal and Gateway 
was created to the WAN interface address and Country Specific IP addresses (Re-
gions) were configured to allow IPSec VPN and SSL connection to the GP Portal and 
gateway from Finland and Sweden only. GP modes were tested separately; first user-
logon, then on-demand and finally pre-logon. Since GP needs certificates in order to 
work, the following certificates were created: 
 
 One self-signed Root CA Certificate (KotiRoot) 
 One Server Certificate for external VPN Gateway signed by Root CA (KotiOut-
side2) 
 One Server Certificate for internal VPN Gateway signed by Root CA (Koti-
Inside) 
 One Device Certificate for Win7 Laptop (KotiLaptop) 
 One Device Certificate for iPAD (700padlv100...) 
 One Device Certificate for Android Phone (PL-SII) 
 One Sub-CA Certificate signed by Root CA for SSL Decryption/Encryption (Ko-
tikoti) 
 
Certificates are illustrated in Figure 19. 
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FIGURE 19. Certificates used during the test. 
 
All the certificates were delivered and installed to the clients to constitute a trust 
relationship between the clients and portal. Management address was created to the 
same address space with WAN interface, but with dedicated IP address to the man-
agement interface. Management interface cannot be reached from the internet even 
it is connected to the WAN interface address space, because ADSL router in the front 
of the NGFW was configured to port forward WAN traffic to the NGFWs WAN inter-
face only. ADSL router had only one public IP address and it was configured to use 
PAT (Port Address Translation) to the outbound traffic. This enabled the use of pri-
vate addresses in the NGFW WAN interface and in other network segments. All the 
inbound traffic originated from the internet to the ADSL router’s WAN address was 
denied except the port forwarded traffic to the public IP.  
 
Also, Security rules were created to the NGFW to allow traffic from the Inside and 
VPN Zones to the management IP address and also management interface itself has 
access lists for allowed IP addresses. This way, management interface could not be 
reached directly from the internet, but with VPN connection it was reached from the 
internet forcing the traffic to go through the NGFW security policies. ADSL router has 
one Public IP address in the WAN interface, using DHCP from the operator and LAN 
interface was configured with DHCP pool where NGFW WAN interface was connect-
 
56 
 
 
ed. Wireless AP (Access Point) was configured and connected to the internal inter-
face of NGFW, using WPA-2 with AES encryption in the wireless radio. This internal 
WLAN was configured to all mobile devices. WLAN interface of the AP had DHCP pool 
for wireless clients and by default it was NATing traffic for outbound connection. 
 
Testing period was 6 months for all devices. All the device-specific updates were ap-
plied during the test period that was available to each device, including NGFW. Rules 
and features were fine-tuned whenever needed to achieve desired outcome, resolve 
problems or correcting misconfigured results. 
 
Connection Methods to Test in the Gateway 
 
There are three different connection methods to choose from: 
 
 User-Logon 
 On-Demand 
 Pre-Logon 
 
User-Logon method operates in the following way: when user logs on to the device, 
GP Client attempts to establish a VPN connection automatically to the GP gateway. 
Combined to Single Sign-on (SSO) option, Windows logon credentials are used to 
authenticate the user. If Global Protect Portal and Gateway License (subscription) is 
applied, then the location awareness is automatically on. This way, VPN is estab-
lished in the external network and is not established in the internal network. Without 
the license, VPN is always established as soon as user logs on to the computer. 
 
In On-Demand method, a user must explicitly initiate the VPN connection to the GP 
gateway. Credential stored on the GP Client can be used to authenticate the user. 
This is an ideal solution for partner remote access usage as well as some BYODT de-
ployments. VPN will be disconnected when idle time out exceeds or user disconnects 
the VPN connection. 
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Pre-Logon method means that whenever user machine is turned on, regardless of 
the location, the VPN connection is established prior to user logon, using machine 
certificates for authentication. This way, client machine can logon directly to AD do-
main, just like in corporate LAN, which enables AD group policy enforcement, pass-
word reset/changes, drive mappings and software deployments downloads – even 
when the user is not logged in to the machine. It only requires that the machine is 
turned on and has an internet connection. HIP profiles can be used to limit traffic to 
or from these pre-logon identified machines, since specific user identification cannot 
be used prior user logon. When user logs on to the machine, user is identified and 
user logs in to the domain and the rest of the security policies can be applied to the 
VPN connection, since user is identified during the logon. 
 
Agent Options 
 
There are several options to choose to enable or disable in the end user’s VPN client. 
The Graphical User Interface (GUI) existence can be enabled or disabled. By enabling 
this option, user has some visibility for the agent and connection. This should be en-
abled to provide support in trouble-shooting tasks. It also enables support or end 
user to temporarily disable the whole client with passcode, comment or using ticket-
ing system by using Agent User Override option. This can be set to disabled as well, 
to provide read-only view for the user. User can save password –option should be 
enabled to provide SSO (Single Sign-On) feature. Client upgrade can also be per-
formed transparently or with option to select user to choose it, see Figure 20. 
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FIGURE 20. Agent options for end user’s GUI 
 
When testing the different features, GUI was left on, with a possibility to change all 
the settings that are changeable. In production environment, GUI provides some vis-
ibility to the user, so it should be turned on in read-only mode. The password option 
may be left on also for administration purposes, or disabled, if the company policy 
requires the machine to be carried to the office for troubleshooting case or if the 
remote connection is not so critical service in the company. 
 
4.3 Installations and Tests 
 
4.3.1 Android Installation with Global Protect Client 
 
Android installation was performed from Play Store and there was not any errors 
encountered during installation of Global Protect (GP) Client. After entering the por-
tal address, username and password with remember me option, the connection was 
established and fully working (Figure 21). The only negative effect was that user 
needs to click “I trust this application” every time the device is started up (Figure 22). 
After clicking OK, the device never asked it again, until the device is rebooted again. 
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This should be one time feature only, instead of a feature asked after every boot. The 
default behavior when the gateway is unavailable is that the GP client allows all net-
work connectivity. When the GP gateway is available again, VPN connection is estab-
lished automatically.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 21. GP Portal Settings FIGURE 22. Connection establishment 
 
Figure 23 illustrates the situation, when connection has been established to the 
gateway and location is an external network (internet) and therefore VPN has been 
automatically turned on. Figure 24 presents the statistics of the VPN connection. IP 
address has been assigned from the VPN Pool, network is mobile network and Proto-
col is IPSec, since it is the most efficient transport method, because it is using UDP 
instead of TCP. If IPSec connection to the gateway cannot be established, then 
fallback method is SSL, which is usually open in the network. IPSec may be prohibited 
in some networks by service provider. If the portal’s certificates have not been im-
ported to the Android device before connecting to the gateway, the certificate notifi-
cation will be prompted. This needs user to agree prior to connect to the gateway. 
After installing the certificates, no prompts were generated; however in an Android 
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device, this kind of prompt occurred once in the test period, even when the certifi-
cates were installed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 23. Connection established FIGURE 24. VPN Status. 
 
The user can circumvent the VPN connectivity by uninstalling the application, not 
trusting the application when it asks to trust the application, disabling the application 
(see Figure 25 and 26) if that is allowed in the gateway parameters (Agent User Over-
ride parameter) or with a factory reset. These circumvents can be addressed by the 
following way: 
 
 Palo Alto Networks changes the (default) behavior of the application from 
“trust approved by the user during every boot” to “one time only feature”, in-
stead of asked after every boot in the Android version of GP. 
 Disabling application by the user is controlled in the gateway using Agent Us-
er Override parameter with the password or disabled option. Password must 
be protected by need-to-know basis and cannot be revealed to end users. 
 Uninstalling application can be prevented or detected with MDM solution by 
password protection or similar controls 
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 Factory reset is not feasible to be address, since encrypted device remain pro-
tected and user will lost all the phone-specific data during the factory reset. 
Also, company will lose the data in the device and company data and network 
cannot be accessed until MDM forces the company security settings to the 
device again. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 25. Disabling GP        FIGURE 26. Enabling GP 
 
If all of the mentioned improvements are done, GP can be forced with the desired 
settings for the remote users with some level of confidence that the application is 
always up and running. Comprehensive protection means that security is addresses 
in a controlled manner in the NGFW gateway and portal, by the vendor’s software 
and using MDM solution to force and control settings and behavior or the device. In 
addition, company’s processes and agreements should be in place to support user 
education and responsibilities. 
 
 
 
  
62 
 
 
4.3.2 Android Usage with Global Protect Client 
 
In the daily mobile use, GP client is transparent. There is only a small icon on the top 
left side of the Android bar indicating the network location and VPN status. Figure 27 
illustrates the network location as Internet and the key indicates that the VPN is 
turned on based on the location (outside defined home-network). Figure 28 illus-
trates the defined home-network, where the VPN is not enabled. 
 
 
FIGURE 27. Internet-connection with VPN   FIGURE 28. Internal-network without VPN 
 
When Wi-Fi was turned on in home location (Figure 29), GP client noticed the new 
network and whether it is able to connect to its own internal gateway, then the net-
work is considered as internal network and the VPN is disconnected. Once the Wi-FI 
is turned off or connected to another network, then connectivity to the internal 
gateway is lost and VPN will be established to the GP Portal (external gateway), Fig-
ure 30). Notifications can be turned off to better support transparency for the user. 
This can be done from the phones’ settings by selecting Settings, Application manag-
er, then selecting GlobalProtect and tapping off the Show notifications -option. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 29. Wi-Fi in internal network        FIGURE 30. Switching to external location 
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Figure 31 illustrates a management view of NGFW in an Android’s phone browser 
using VPN connection. Management IP address is in private address space and can-
not be reachable directly from the internet, only from internal network or via VPN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 31. Using management interface with VPN enabled. 
 
Testing the functionalities of SSL Decryption/Encryption, a web page was opened 
from the internet using the VPN connection and Android’s web browser. Eicar.org-
site has a Test Virus called Eicar that can be tested against company’s AV functionali-
ty. It can be downloaded using plain (unencrypted) HTTP and more secured (encrypt-
ed) HTTPS protocol. Figure 32 illustrates the web site where the test virus can be 
loaded using SSL (HTTPS). 
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FIGURE 32. Using Android browser to access encrypted web page with SSL 
 
Figure 33 illustrates the message displayed to the user when unwanted programs has 
been detected and blocked from the user’s traffic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 33. Blocked Eicar test virus from encrypted SSL traffic 
 
Eicar was used only to test the correct behavior and configuration of NGFW. Using 
SSL Decryption/Encryption in the real traffic is more challenging, because user’s pri-
vacy needs to be protected while unwanted software needs to be blocked. Also, per-
sonnel need to be informed before any changes to logging or collecting user’s data 
are done, depending somewhat on country specific privacy laws. Also, collecting us-
er-specific data, users must be informed in advance and they must have a change to 
accept or decline it and they have the right to know all the details of their records, its 
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usage, how it is protected and its lifecycle. They have also right to get their infor-
mation when requested and the records must be deleted if user later on decides to 
resign from its usage. SSL Encryption/Decryption cannot be done, if applications re-
quire browsers to present a client side certificate or if the encryption is proprietary 
decryption. It is challenging to use SSL Encryption/Decryption efficiently without 
breaking the functionality of business applications and still decrypt questionable traf-
fic, especially in BYOD environment. During the tests, Apple Store and iTunes connec-
tions and Google Maps stopped working when SSL Encryption/Decryption was ena-
bled. Since restriction cannot be done based on the application, instead by catego-
ries, those categories must be excluded from the decryption process. After exclusion, 
functionalities worked again. 
 
Custom categories can help distinguishing the web sites from each other, since wild-
cards can be used, like *.facebook.com, in addition to “content-delivery-network” 
category, for example. In Figure 34 a custom category “PL-Exemptions” rule was cre-
ated to decrypt traffic to the desired domains that overlaps with pre-defined catego-
ries in the rule below in “NO-Decrypt2” rule. The last rule will decrypt every SSL-
traffic that is not excluded in the rules above. It is important, that Financial-category 
is not decrypted to prevent decrypting of user’s banking and credit card transactions. 
Web-email Category is also challenging, since user’s use personal web-based emails 
for personal usage. Therefore, privacy issues may arise if decrypting Web-email Cat-
egory, however it also poses a risk, since users tend to receive phishing emails and 
transfer attachments via encrypted email services and if not decrypted, this poses a 
risk to the company. Finnish legislation of user’s privacy is determined in the law 
13.8.2004/759 and concerning EU countries, in EU’s directive 2002/58/EC.  
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FIGURE 34. Fine-tuning SSL Decryption/Encryption with categories 
 
Eicar was also downloaded as unencrypted with Android using Avast! Mobile Security 
product and it did not recognize Eicar test virus downloaded from the internet at 
eicar.org. Application version was 1.0.2129 and it recognizes 5944 definition with 
definition version of: 130813-01 updated at 13th of August 2013. Test was done at 
14th August 2013. 
 
User-Logon Tests 
 
During the test period, Wi-FI and Bluetooth tethering could not be used while GP 
Client was running VPN. Therefore, internet connection cannot be sheared with the 
device running GP with some other devices using Wi-Fi or Bluetooth connection. This 
prevents unknown devices to share VPN connection that would cause security risks 
to the company. A personal wireless device and application was tested during testing 
period. A wireless transmitter was attached to the earphone plug and a radio con-
trolled car was used with iPAD and Android phone without any problem with GP Cli-
ent running VPN connection. iPad and Android have a small application called SP Au-
to (Figure 30) that loads a car controller board to mobile device touch screen and 
controls the car using wireless adapter on the earphone plug. Another similar kind of 
devices and applications (like Radio) can be used together with GP client, since they 
do not interact with any communication channels of the mobile device, such as blue-
tooth or Wi-FI.  
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When VPN is enabled, it prevents any other direct connections to the client, e.g. re-
mote access connection using Kier Air or similar software. When VPN is turned off in 
the internal network, these kinds of direct connections to the phone are available 
again. Thus, in BYOD solution GP will protect the mobile device like any other VPN 
solution that is configured for Full Tunneling Mode. This means that the company 
policy applies to the user mobile device 24h per day, 7 days a week. If the company 
policy conflicts with the user behavior, the company can apply different kind of poli-
cies for outside office hours and weekends using scheduled security rules, user 
groups and HIP rules for different mobile devices. This may limit a user’s personal 
internet usage, depending how internet-usage conflicts with the company policy; 
however it also provides better security for the user. 
 
Data usage examples for two months are illustrated below, in Figures 35 and 36, tak-
en during User-Logon testing period. Data usage has considerable effect on battery 
lifetime of a small device, whereas tablets have more capacity on their battery and 
therefore effect on lifetime is smaller. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 35. Data usage at June             FIGURE 36. Data usage at July 
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Data usage limits and alerts can be configured to prevent unnecessary data or roam-
ing costs, especially in when abroad. GP Client itself does not generate traffic much 
more than without VPN, but it will consume some CPU processing power and there-
fore effects battery consumption. Based on the tests, without GP Client actively 
turned on, the battery lasts for about 1.5 day before it need to be recharged. With 
GP Client actively on, it lasts whole day (from 8 am to 8 pm) before it must be re-
charged. Testing days were typical working days for one person; however phone us-
ages vary much between different people. Testing device’s battery was one year old. 
 
On-Demand Tests 
 
When On-Demand mode was selected in the connection method, the Android GP 
Client changed the behavior with the possibility to connect/disconnect VPN. Thus, 
VPN must be initiated by the user as illustrated in Figures 37 and 38. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 37. On-Demand Mode at              FIGURE 38. On-Demand Mode 
                     disconnected-state              connected-state 
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Pre-Logon Tests 
 
Pre-Logon functionality is used only for Windows operating systems and only with 
machine certificates.  However, a test was done with a user certificate generated for 
user’s device, signed by NGFW’s root CA. Then, a certificate profile using NGFW’s 
root CA was generated and assigned to the portal. When installing the certificate to 
the device and applied the Certification Profile to the NGFW, GP worked as in User-
Logon tests. However, if the certificate was missing from the device, an error mes-
sage was displayed, as illustrated in Figure 39 and VPN Connection was not estab-
lished until the device certificate was installed. Users can install the certificate by 
clicking the Install-button and selecting the folder where the certificate file exists (if 
distributed to the user) or choosing to install the certificate later. After installing the 
certificate, or if the certificate has been distributed to the user, user needs to choose 
and accept (allow) the certificate when the connection attempts the next time, see 
Figure 40. This is a one-time functionality and the device remembers the certificate 
for the future connection attempts and uses it automatically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 39. Certificate not installed FIGURE 40. Certificate installed 
 
Using certificates limits the connections to the portal and gateway for devices only 
with a valid certificate installed. If this certificate profile was chosen also to the 
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gateway and the user-logon was changed to pre-logon mode, the Android GP appli-
cation crashed when connected to the internal network via Wi-Fi and stayed in the 
crash-loop until Wi-Fi was disconnected. However, connection using GSM data was 
operated normally to the WAN portal and gateway. This behavior was tested a few 
times and the only way to recover was to delete user certificates, reboot the device 
and reinstall the application. Apple’s iOS (iPAD) and Win7 worked normally during 
this test. This possible bug will be reported to the Palo Alto Networks. Another ver-
sion of Samsung phone did not crash, so this may be a device model specific bug for 
Samsung SII GT-I9100 model. The purpose of this test was only to see, that Pre-Logon 
mode would not affect the devices that cannot do pre-logon. 
 
Android with built-in VPN Client 
 
Android built-in VPN Client was also tested. Built-in VPN Client in Android version 
4.1.2 and one version earlier were not able to establish a VPN connection. Version 
4.1.2 establishes a VPN connection, but no traffic was seen in or out of the device. 
The earlier version crashed the software and the phone rebooted every time the VPN 
connection was established. This build-in VPN Client could have been used for on 
demand VPN connections. This way user could establish and disconnect the VPN 
when needed. GP Client offers the same functionality with expanded functionalities, 
so build-in VPN client test was not tested any further. 
 
4.3.3 iPAD installation with Global Protect Client 
 
Global Protect for iPAD was downloaded and installed from AppStore. No errors or 
problems were encountered during installation. After entering the portal address, 
username and password with remember me option, the connection was established 
and fully working (Figure 41).  
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FIGURE 41. GP Settings in iPAD 
 
The default behavior when the gateway is unavailable is that the GP client allows all 
network connectivity. When the GP gateway is available again, VPN connection is 
established automatically. However, user can circumvent VPN connectivity from the 
VPN Settings page, by disabling automatic connection establishment (Yhdistä tarvit-
taessa), see Figure 42 or completely uninstalling the application. Modifying applica-
tion parameters by the user, such as enabling or disabling the GP client, can be pre-
vented from the GP gateway. 
 
Next time user is connected to the GP Portal, the settings are obtained automatically 
from the GP gateway, which will override any user-made changes. So, these settings 
are centrally managed and forced to the GP Clients. Different GP Client operating 
modes requires different GP gateways and portals, meaning different Public IP ad-
dresses at the gateway. Like in Android, IPSec is the default connection method and 
SSL is the fallback method. If the certificates are not imported to the iPAD, when 
connecting the first time to the portal, the connection is not established. When the 
certificates have been imported and installed, the connection will establish without 
problems. 
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FIGURE 42. GP VPN Settings 
 
4.3.4 iPAD usage with Global Protect Client 
 
In the daily mobile use, GP client is transparent, just as it is in Android devices. There 
is only a small icon on the top left side of the iPAD’s information bar indicating the 
network location and VPN status (Figure 43). The VPN icon is displayed in both, in-
ternal and external locations, unlike Android, where the icon was different based on 
the location. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 43. VPN indicates that GP is up and running. 
 
FIGURE 44 illustrates the network location as Internet and VPN is turned on based on 
the location (outside defined home-network). Figure 45 shows the VPN details. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 44. Location is Internet and VPN is enabled 
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Unlike Android’s GP Client informed GP specific information in the mobile phone’s 
information bar at the top of the phone, all the information regarding to GP Client is 
informed under the GP Client’s application tab “info”. So, user really does not need 
to be aware of this application – only the “VPN” text is seen in the top left bar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 45. VPN Connection details when connected via Internet 
 
Figure 46 illustrates the defined home-network, where the VPN is not enabled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 46. Location is Internal and VPN is not enabled 
 
The same sites were tested as with Android and also SSL Decryption and Encryption 
for verifying the correct behavior of the gateway’s security policy and that certificate 
was trusted and no error messages appeared. 
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User-Logon Tests 
 
Tests and behavior with iPAD were uniform with Android. Certification prompts were 
never shown if the certificates were installed before using GP Client, unlike Android 
prompted it once even they were installed. If the iPAD does not have SIM-card in-
stalled and uses only WLAN, there is no need for paying attention to roaming costs. 
Battery lifetime is much longer than a phone’s lifetime, therefore GP Client has a 
minor effect on it. As in Android’s User-Logon Tests at page 66-68, GP prevents local 
access to the device if using any communication channels like WiFI or Mobile data via 
SIM card. 
 
On-Demand Tests 
 
When using On-Demand Mode, the possibility to “connect automatically” disappears 
from the VPN Settings, as seen in Figure 47. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 47. VPN Settings in On-Demand mode 
 
User must open the GP Client and touch the connect-button in order to establish a 
VPN connection to the gateway. VPN disconnects automatically after about a 2-
minute idle time or when user chooses to disconnect. This is equal behavior to iPAD’s 
built-in VPN Client. This gives a great deal of freedom to the user, since VPN is con-
nected only when access to the corporate data is needed. Thus, any personal com-
munications can take place when disconnecting the VPN and the user-specific per-
sonal communication has minimum interaction with corporate network and data. 
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Pre-Logon Tests 
 
Pre-Logon functionality is used only for Windows operating systems and only with 
machine certificates.  Device certificate is distributed to the client and installed by 
the user (Figure 48). After installation, GP works as in User-Logon tests and this is the 
way it should be, since Pre-Logon tests should not affect devices that cannot present 
machine certificates. If pre-logon fails, then normal authentication follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 48. Device certificate installation by user 
 
iPAD with built-in VPN Client 
 
Build-in VPN Client works as expected. User needs to enter gateway information and 
userid and password information in order to establish a connection (Figure 49). At 
the gateway side, “Enable X-Auth Support” needs to be enabled with group creden-
tials or certificate configured in NGFW in order to support 3rd party IPSec Clients. 
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FIGURE 49. Apple iOS native VPN Client 
 
The idle time-out in the device seems to be configured in around 2 minutes. After 
two-minutes of inactivity, user needs to re-establish the connection. This is a device 
specific feature, which cannot be changed by the user. Built-in VPN Client can be 
used together with GP installed on iPAD as long as they are not enabled at the same 
time. This way user can have several different VPN tunnels to several locations or 
companies. Best result is achieved, when all the VPN tunnels are configured as on-
demand mode to prevent them to interference each other’s behavior. 
 
4.3.5 Windows7 Installation with Global Protect Client 
 
Windows7 installation and settings were applied and a connection was established 
without problems. Client needs to have a connection to the Portal and Gateway dur-
ing installation, in order to test the Client and credentials. Settings are illustrated in 
Figure 50. Client can be delivered to devices without GUI (Graphical User Interface) 
and also preconfigure to use the user’s logon credentials. 
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FIGURE 50. Connection Settings with Windows7 GP Client 
 
GP Client is transparent, just like in Android and Apple devices, where only the ser-
vice icon is displayed located in the lower right corner of the screen, see Figure 51. 
 
 
FIGURE 51. GP Client icon 
 
Windows GP Client collects information about the host state, e.g. installed AV, Mi-
crosoft patches and version information, logon domain, IP addresses in use, network 
interfaces, registry entries, etc, see Figure 52. This information can be used against 
the NGFW’s security policies to verify what kind of device is connecting to the gate-
way and make policies according to the HIP information. Different settings can be 
defined to the HIP profiles, and used to distinguish devices with different access lev-
els, such as corporate devices, BYOD devices and partners’ devices. 
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FIGURE 52. Host identification information 
 
4.3.6 Windows7 Usage with Global Protect Client 
 
Discovery works as expected. Every time the network changes, GP Client detects 
whether internal or external network and establish VPN accordingly, see Figures 53-
54. Without GUI, only a small icon is displayed with a splash bubble displaying any 
changes in the GP Client’s connectivity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 53. Discovery process    FIGURE 54. Discovery completed 
 
SSL Decryption/Encryption was also tested to verify correct functionality and it 
worked as expected, see Figures 55-56. A virus was blocked inside SSL traffic and the 
certificate was fully trusted and user was not asked to trust the certificate. Figure 56 
illustrates the certificate chain and Figure 57 illustrates how Subordinate Certificate 
Authority –type of certificate generates server certificate on-the-fly and signs the 
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secure.eicar.org –certificate. This way, the traffic can be automatically analyzed by 
the security policy, and automatic alarms can be generated if critical and/or high 
threats are detected and the traffic can be prevented before it is delivered to the 
client. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 55. Eicar-virus blocked inside SSL traffic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 56. Certificate chain             FIGURE 57. Certificate Details 
 
In order to distribute the certificate to the clients, several methods need to be done. 
In IE (Internet Explorer) distribution is the easiest in corporate environment, since 
certificates can be delivered using existing methods, like WSUS, SCCM or Group Poli-
cy updates. This is because IE uses Windows OS’ certificate store, where-as Firefox 
uses its own database for certificates as well as other Firefox specific settings. Firefox 
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and Chrome need some additional scripts to deliver the certificates to the users. 
When using Apple’s Safari browser, usually the end user installs the certificate, even 
when pushed via MDM solution, user still needs to accept the certificate. 
 
User-Logon Tests 
 
In user-logon mode, GP establishes a connection, when user logs on to the computer. 
It automatically discovers the network and connects to the portal for latest configu-
ration changes or updates and establishes a VPN tunnel to the corporate gateway, if 
located outside corporate network. If located in the internal network, VPN will not be 
established. Usually, devices are not connected to two or more different network at 
the same time. Interfaces are typically prioritized because of routing issues to decide 
which route will take effect if there are several interfaces available. One of the inter-
faces must be the default route where traffic is routed unless static entries define 
differently. This will cause a problem to client connectivity, therefore it is usually 
solved by disabling WLAN if LAN is available in BIOS settings or alternatively with ad-
ditional software delivered with the laptop. And, when LAN is not available, WLAN is 
turned back on which will prevent simultaneous interfaces to be active at the same 
time.  
 
With mobile devices like phones and tablets, this is not a problem either, since they 
only have wireless interfaces and once one interface is on, others are shut down. 
Thus, it is not so important to test VPN functionality with simultaneous interfaces on, 
since it will establish a VPN connection whenever it discovers to be on the internet. 
But, if the previous problem exist, that simultaneous interfaces are actively on with 
different security zones (connections, like internal and internet network), the prob-
lem needs to be resolved in the host side, not in the VPN client. In this kind of situa-
tion, VPN Client is typically configured to secure the client connection and establish 
the VPN connection. Overall, user-logon tests were reliable and successful and there 
were no problems using it with other security products likes AV or FW in the host. 
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On-Demand Tests 
 
On-demand test worked as reliably as the user-logon test. The gateway was config-
ured to use on-demand, instead of user-logon and next time the client connects to 
the portal, it will get the updated parameters and works accordingly. After that, user 
can connect or disconnect VPN by on-demand, when needed. This setting is ideal for 
partners and GP client works with other VPN products installed in the client’s com-
puter, like Juniper Network Connect Virtual Adapter, Cisco Systems VPN Adapter and 
PAN Virtual Ethernet Adapter.  
 
Pre-Logon Tests 
 
Pre-logon feature requires a machine type of certificate installed into the client en-
rolled by the Certificate Service in the Windows AD. No other type of certificate is 
sufficient to test this feature, which limits the Operating System requirement also to 
the Windows platforms. 
 
Figure 58 illustrates a pre-logon user that has turned on a company laptop and has 
not yet logged in, or the user has logged off from the computer but the computer still 
has a network connection to the company. The user cannot be authenticated if he or 
she is not logged in and therefore the user is not identified; however the computer is 
authenticated using the machine certificate. This way, a company’s computer is un-
der the control of IT services and it can be supported remotely. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 58. Pre-logon user identified 
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As soon as the user logs on to computer, he or she can be authenticated and more 
network level access can be granted defined by the security policy rules. Pre-logon 
feature offers a domain-level logon, which enables the use of network shares, print-
ers, logon scripts, updates and all the other domain-level services, including the us-
er’s password reset remotely by the support team. Therefore, pre-logon feature of-
fers virtually the same services, as if the user were in the office. Figure 50 illustrates 
the log entries, when the user logs in to the computer. The first four log entries are 
located at the bottom of Figure 59 and the computer is identified as pre-logon, since 
the computer was restarted with the internet connection. The rest of the log entries 
were generated, when the user logged on to the computer and the user was identi-
fied with Single Sign-On. Single Sign-On feature enables the VPN connectivity without 
any user interaction. This way, VPN works seamlessly from the end user perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 59. Pre-logon user logs in to the computer 
 
In the pre-logon scenario, it is important to secure the end device with a passcode, a 
password or some other method during the boot process but also use the idle time 
or smartcards that locks the computer after a certain period of idle time or if the 
smartcard is removed. If the company already has a strong authentication, it should 
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not be changed to worse when implementing a VPN solution. Therefore, it is im-
portant to implement a password request before boot, which is something the user 
knows. Then, taking advantage of the machine certificate which is something the 
user has, which cannot be accesses without a boot password. Alternatively, a smart-
card carrying a certificate secured by a PIN code or password in addition to domain 
credentials can be utilized during the logon or VPN connection or both. Also, the end 
device’s data should be encrypted either partially for confidential and critical data 
only or entirely. 
 
Pre-logon configuration in the NGFW included a Certification trust parameters con-
figured in the Certification Profile, which was assigned to the Global Protect Portal 
and the Gateway, as illustrated in Figures 60 and 61. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 60. Certification Profile defines the trust relationship of the certificates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 61. Pre-logon and the Trusted Root CA definitions 
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Pre-logon tests were done in the NCC’s environment with a 30-day of trial license, 
because the test environment did not include a Windows domain and a Certification 
Service. Therefore the test period was limited to 30 days for pre-logon feature and 
the PAN-OS version was 5.0.6 and GP Client version was 1.2.5. 
 
4.3.7 QoS Testing 
 
Quality of Service was tested with Youtube application by defining Youtube as class 8 
with maximum bandwidth of 1 Mb/s as illustrated in Figure 62.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 62. QoS example with bandwidth limitation based on application 
 
All the other data are class 4 by default with no maximum bandwidth limitation. Fig-
ure 62 illustrates how class 8 cannot exceed 1 Mb/s limit, while class 4 can reach the 
maximum limit, which is about 2 Mb/s, see the “Runtime Bandwidth” and “Maximum 
Egress Bandwidth” for both classes. Because of QoS-limit, the downloading will take 
more time, since bandwidth is less than class 4 with no limit; however, the applica-
tion is still allowed and fully functional. This helps enterprises to prioritize traffic 
based on application criticality to guarantee bandwidth to more important applica-
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tions while still allowing less important applications in race condition. Figure 63 illus-
trates how less important applications get less capacity, thus showing in horizontally 
and more important applications get more capacity and are seen in vertically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 63. Important application gets more bandwidth than less important 
 
4.3.8 Geographical location usage 
 
The use of regions is practical, when limiting traffic from the internet, for remote 
access users for example, as illustrated in Figure 64. If users are located in the specif-
ic countries, they can be allowed and others denied by default. For example, Global 
Protect gateway can be allowed for IPsec, but portal access can be limited to coun-
tries, where company has business or partners. This reduces the noise hitting from 
the Internet to the perimeter network and false logon attempts to the portal. Com-
bined to the DoS Protection and Zone Protection, it will reduce network scanning, 
reconnaissance and flooding further. 
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FIGURE 64. Other regions than Finland are dropped by default, like USA (US) 
 
Drop in the log means dropped connection and end in the log means successful con-
nection. 
 
4.3.9 HIP Matching 
 
HIPs are logged under HIP Match logs, where detailed information of the devices and 
their appearance times can be seen, as illustrated in figure 65. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 65. HIP logs of remote users’ devices 
 
When choosing the first log entry in Figure 56, Apple iPAD’s HIP information can be 
seen, as illustrated in Figure 66. It includes userid, assigned VPN IP address and real 
IP address obtained from the local network, MAC address, device name and OS ver-
sion. 
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FIGURE 66. Apple iPAD HIP information 
 
Choosing the second log entry, MS Windows7 device HIP information is revealed, as 
illustrated in Figure 67-69. Just like in Apple iPAD, the similar information is revealed, 
but in case of Windows, all the details about patches, disk encryption, backup etc. 
are revealed as well and all of this information is available to make use of in the HIP 
profiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 67. MS Windows device HIP information 
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FIGURE 68 MS Windows device HIP information of FW, encryption and backup 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 69. MS Windows device HIP information of patch management 
 
HIP information was tested in the security policy as follows: Security policy was gen-
erated allowing management access to the NFGW and Aruba management interface 
by defining also certain devices in the HIP column in the “Admin HIP to MGMT” rule. 
After the rule was tested to work, as illustrated in Figure 70, then additional “Deny 
MGMT Rest” rule was added to deny the rest of the traffic to the management, as 
illustrated in Figure 71. The security police operated logically with the rules and An-
droid device could not log in to the management console after the security policy 
was committed, since only Apple’s iOS 6.1 and Windows7 were allowed. 
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FIGURE 70. A log entry of a successful management connection with HIP enabled 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 71. Security Policy leveraging the HIP information for management access 
 
4.3.10 Threat Identification 
 
Threats are identified using dynamic updates from Palo Alto and criterions are de-
fined based on the threats’ risk levels (severities), threat types or individual threat 
IDs. Those criteria can then be grouped to a Profile and are leveraged in the Security 
Policy’s Profiles in each Security Rule. Different threat Profiles are:  
 
 Antivirus (using following decoders: FTP, HTTP, IMAP, POP3, SMB, SMTP) 
 Anti-Spyware (can be customized in addition to dynamic updates) 
 Vulnerability Protection (in CVE-database format) 
 URL Filtering (using Palo Alto’s database or Bright Cloud’s database) 
 
.. 
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 File Blocking (can be used to send to the WildFire Cloud) 
 Data Filtering (using regex-format) 
 DoS Protection (flood and resource protection). 
 
Figure 72 illustrates Threat, WildFire, Global Protect and Application updates that are 
used in the Threat Profiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 72. Scheduled dynamic updates 
 
All of these include individual signatures that can be included or excluded from the 
profiles or defined with another criterion like a threat’s severities which all have simi-
lar behaviors, like block or allow. These properties have been illustrated in Figures 
73-75. 
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FIGURE 73. Antivirus profile with default and block definitions 
 
Default actions means, that every threat ID has a default action based on the behav-
ior: The more serious the threat, the stricter the default action. It can also be select-
ed manually as allow, alert, block or default. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 74. Anti-Spyware profile with criterion that blocks all critical threats 
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FIGURE 75. Vulnerability Protection profile where critical threats are captured 
 
It is important to remember that in every Profile’s Action criteria, Alert means that 
traffic is allowed and logged, whereas Allowed means allowed, but not logged. So 
Alert should be always used for allowed traffic to get the log entries, unless specifi-
cally not wanted to log traffic. An example of URL Filtering Profile is illustrated in Fig-
ure 76. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 76. URL Filtering with blocked and logged (alert) categories 
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URL-Filtering uses Bright Cloud or Palo Alto Networks databases. During the past year 
(24.8.2012 – 30.8.2013) at NCC using Bright Cloud database, 22 false categorized 
web sites were found that prevented business traffic. They were all categorized as 
adult-and-pornography category, which they were not. Comparing these sites to Palo 
Alto Network’s database, it categorized 11 of these to right – or close to right – cate-
gory and 11 for unknown category. Unknown means that the database does not 
know the category yet, but it will be categorized by the cloud after a while and will 
be recognized in the future updates and will be pushed to the client by the vendor. In 
addition, four sites were found to be suspicious: two of them as malware sites and 
another two for spam sites. One of the spam sites was asked to be re-categorized 
since it was needed by the business and it was changed to the business-and-
economy category. All of these sites were located in Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Fin-
land. 
 
File Blocking and URL Categories work in a similar way as the previous threat protec-
tion profiles; however File Blocking Profile also includes the possibility to send the 
file to the WildFire Cloud, see Figure 77. This should be used as default behavior in 
Internet traffic, whereas internal traffic may not want to be sent to the cloud, but all 
the other protection mechanisms should be used internally. As a rule of thumb, all 
internet-related critical threats in every profile should be blocked packet captured 
and send to the WildFire if possible. Internally, all critical threats should be blocked, 
except vulnerabilities may want to be left as alert, instead of blocking mode at least 
some part of the internal network. This depends somewhat on the company’s seg-
mentations, like server’s criticalities, DMZ traffic’s criticalities and business applica-
tions.  
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FIGURE 77. File Blocking Profile with all files sent to the WildFire for analysis 
 
Data Filtering is about administrator defined regex strings that can be used as filters 
in different kind of traffic. Data Pattern for “Luottamuksellinen” (“Confidential”) is 
illustrated in the Data Filtering Profile in Figure 78. These filters can then be used to 
block, allow, packet capture and alert desired groups of peoples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 78. Data Pattern in the Data Filtering Profile 
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Once the Security Profiles are defined, they can be activated in the Security Rules. 
Different Profiles should be created for at least Internal, DMZ and External (Internet) 
traffic for easier management of different needs. In Figure 79 there is an example of 
security rule for Internet traffic, where allowed applications are in one application 
group and a “Tuotanto-INTERNET” Security Group that consists of Security Profiles of 
all of the threats:  Antivirus, Anti-Spyware, Vulnerability Protection, URL Filtering, File 
Blocking and Data Filtering. DoS Protection needs to be defined in a different Securi-
ty Policy and cannot be added into the Security Group Profile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 79. Security Group that includes all Security Profiles for Internet traffic 
 
4.3.11 WildFire Reports during the Test Period 
 
After the test environment was set up including WildFire functionality, the ADSL 
Router was updated to the latest firmware, since it was jamming (halted) regularly. 
During the search of the latest firmware from the Internet, the following WildFire log 
entries were encountered at 7th of June 2013, see Figure 80. 
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FIGURE 80. Malicious file detected from the traffic 
 
When the log details were further analyzed, the indiftpd.exe file included several 
files with pv.exe file and a virus in it, called a Win32.neshta.bxs detected at 2nd May 
2013, see Figure 81. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 81. Pv.exe contains a malicious file 
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A packet capture was defined to all critical threats, thus the content can be seen in 
the NGFW GUI or exporting the network traffic using the Export button, see Figure 
82. Exported file is pcap-format which can be viewed with packet capture programs, 
like WireShark, for example. Packet capture captures packets only until traffic is ter-
minated by the NGFW, therefore only first packets are captured. If the traffic is con-
figured to allow or alert, then more packets are captured. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 82. Content of the pv.exe 
 
In Figure 83 is the analysis result of the Win32.neshta.bxs. It creates an executable 
file in the windows folder, which is seen as the most severe threat behavior in this 
case. All the other behaviors are not malicious and therefore this particular case can 
be a false positive alert. However, this report is not detailed enough to decide 
whether it is reliably a virus or not, even there seems to be some malicious behavior. 
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FIGURE 83. Overview of the Win32.neshta.bxs file 
 
To present more confidence and reference to the inspected file, WildFire integrates 
directly to the Virustotal.com service. Virustotal will compare the result of the given 
hash of the sample file to its own database. Its database has the information of total 
44 of different AV vendors and whether they can detect the file, and if they can then 
what the signature version is. Figure 84 illustrates how many vendors detect the file 
(hash) at 13th August 2013. 
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FIGURE 84. 37 AV vendors out of 44 detects the sample file (hash) 
 
Even though the file has been in the database since one year and 10 months, still not 
all AV vendors can detect it, see Figures 85 and 86. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 85. First and last submission of the hash 
 
Many of the AV vendors have named the malware as “Slugin”, as seen in Figure 86. 
The green spot under the Result indicates that the AV vendor does not recognize the 
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variant or it considers it as benign and name of the variant indicates that the vendor 
detects the variant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 86. Different AV vendors detect or do not detect the malware sample 
 
37 out of 44 AV vendors detects the file and identifies it either a Trojan Horse or a 
Virus and only 7 AV vendors do not recognize it or considers it benign. According to 
both WildFire and Virustotal analysis information, it is reasonable to believe that this 
particular file is a malware. 
 
When inspecting the Palo Alto Networks Threat Database with the identified mal-
ware ID: 2023117 again at 22nd November 2013, the name of the variant has changed 
from Win32.neshta.bxs to Trojan/Win32.llac.nar with the new WildFire content re-
lease version of 1143 dated as 8th November 2013, see Figures 87-89. Figure 87 illus-
trates the behavior that has been detected with recent WildFire analyze. The file at-
tempts to modify system registry entries and system configuration to enable auto-
start capability, which is seen questionable behavior (yellow). It also change Internet 
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Explorer settings and inject code to another process, which is definitely a malicious 
behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 87. 
 
Figure 88 illustrates file activity of the sample, including writing files to the temp, 
root, Windows and Windows Systems folders and also a Facebook icon file. At the 
end some of the temp folder’s files are deleted. The file (sample) and hashes are dif-
ferent than in the previous analysis, since WildFire analysis has been done to another 
file with identical behavior and the behavior and virus definition has been updated 
accordingly. 
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FIGURE 88. 
 
Figure 89 illustrates registry modifications including Internet Explorer’s settings, as 
informed in the Behavior section in Figure 87 “Changed security settings of Internet 
Explorer” and “Modified Windows Registries”. 
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FIGURE 89. Detailed registry setting’s modification 
 
Updated WildFire analysis (content release version 1143) is more precious than earli-
er content release and now it clearly shows that the submitted file is a malware. This 
information can be compared to the Virustotal information again to get some refer-
ence to the analysis. See Figures 90-93 of the result of the Virustotal database.  
 
Figure 90 illustrates the detection ratio with 41 AV vendors out of 48 detects the ma-
licious file as Trojan Horse or a Virus while only 7 vendor does not recognize it or 
considers it as benign. The file has been re-analyzed, since analysis date has changed 
to one month and three weeks ago. 
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FIGURE 90. Virustotal database results for given file (hash) 
 
The file has been re-analyzed and the behavior has updated but also the first and last 
submission has been changed, as illustrated in Figure 91. 
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FIGURE 91. First and last submission of the file 
 
The Virustotal’s behavioral information identifies the malicious activity as well, as 
illustrated in Figure 92 and 93. Figure 92 illustrates the Code Injection activity and 
identifies the injected file as explorer.exe (run also as explorer process) with mali-
cious file’s own spawned file and process that it creates in the Created Processes, 
Opened Files and Read Files section. The Shell command seems not working with the 
virtual system which made the analysis, since the result of the shell command is 
failed. Figure 93 illustrates UDP traffic to an IP address that indicates communication 
traffic which usually is directed to Command and Control (C&C) server to confirm 
that the client is compromised and ready to serve the C&C server. 
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FIGURE 92. Behavior information  FIGURE 93. UDP traffic 
 
These two analyses of the same threat ID provided by the Palo Alto Networks threat 
database together with Virustotal’s database analysis information illustrates the con-
stantly changing threat landscape that the companies are facing in a daily basis. 
Threats are changing and new signatures and behavior are constantly analyzed, 
compared and behavior and threat databases are updated to match the recent re-
sults. The behavior based analysis and threat information sharing between parties 
are essential for detecting and preventing zero-day attacks and constantly changing 
threats. Automatically generated information; e.g. statistics and results of analyses 
from sandboxed and virtualized environments with different set of OS and software 
installed that are delivered to the companies, are definitely valuable for identifying 
threats. They are also a competitive advantage among competitors. 
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Some general WildFire statistics were taken from the production environment in NCC 
Finland’s network during the past year at 24.8.2012 – 30.8.2013. 
 
Total number of samples:  2294 (100%) 
Number of malware samples:   326   (14%) 
Number of benign samples: 1968   (86%) 
 
Four different anomalies separated from the samples represented a total of 154 
samples. Those were compared to Virustotal’s AntiVirus database to see how many 
AV vendors detect those threats after one year’s period, on 30th August 2013. 
 
Anomaly 1, time of occurrence: 24.8.-30.8.2012. 
Method: SMTP (email) 
AV coverage by vendor per variants: 34/42, 39/46, 42/46 (detected/total vendors) 
Number of samples: 11 
Behavior: Similar threats (malware) were sent via email using three different variants 
with similar behavior. They all tried to trick a user to click a link or open the attach-
ment disguised as Adobe’s PDF (Portable Document Format)-document but was ac-
tually executable file format (.exe), which would have infected the client and down-
loaded some more malware from identified malware domains, if succeeded in infect-
ing the client. These samples were detected four days after WildFire functionality 
was taken into production, so they may have been seen before WildFire was in use. 
 
Anomaly 2, time of occurrence: 27.8.-12.10.2012 
Method: Web browsing (using browser) 
AV coverage by vendor per variants: 28/40, 16/40 
Number of Samples: 58 
Behavior: Two variants tried to infect client machines using the server side scripting 
language in the destination server. If successful, it would run an executable file in the 
client’s document folder, spawned new processes, created a backdoor, deleted itself, 
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inject code to another process, registered a file as auto-start from a local directory, 
modified IE settings and several other unwanted behavior. 
 
Anomaly 3, time of occurrence: 23.-30.10.2012 
Method: SMTP (email) 
AV coverage by vendor per variants: 42/47, 43/46, 42/47, 40/45, 40/45, 39/46 
Number of samples: 74 
Behavior: six variants tried to infect client using an attachment in the email that 
would have stolen the saved passwords of the FireFox. The attachment appeared to 
be an Adobe PDF document, but it was actually an executable file. 
 
Anomaly 4, time of occurrence: 16.1.-28.1.2013 
Method: Web browsing (using browser) 
AV coverage by vendor per variants: 32/46, 32/46, 30/46, 28/46, 33/44 
Number of samples: 11 
Behavior: five variants tried to infect clients by serving a malware in the web server. 
If the client enters the infected web site, the executable file is downloaded and exe-
cuted in the user document folder. If succeed, then new processes are spawned, the 
code is injected to another processes, IE settings are affected, FireFox passwords are 
stolen, it visits malware sites and attempts to sleep for a long period of time. 
 
Anomalies number one and three represents threats sent to the user through email 
with a malicious attachment or link included. It is worthwhile to mention the 
ThreatSim’s phishing-for-hire campaigns (Verizon, 2013, 38). It states that running 
with three emails grants the attacker more than 50% possibility of getting at least 
one click. Running that campaign twice and the probability rises up to 80%, and send-
ing 10 phishing emails will almost guarantee on getting a click. The inevitability of a 
click is illustrated in Figure 94. (Verizon, 2013, 38). 
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FIGURE 94. Inevitability of a click in a phishing campaign (Verizon, 2013, 38) 
 
The exploit is only possible, if the user actually clicks the link, has a vulnerability on 
the system, and the malware can be quietly installed without the user awareness and 
the communication path is available to the attacker (Verizon, 2013, 38). 
All the other malware samples represent more evenly distributed behaviors that var-
ied greatly. Some worrying example was seen although, which was at the end of the 
test period. One backdoor was seen in the Hewlett Packard’s BIOS driver during the 
download from HP’s web site (Figure 95). 
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FIGURE 95. Backdoor in HP BIOS driver file sp62738.exe 
 
File “sp62738.exe” is a HP’s BIOS update for certain models of HP’s laptops. Wild-
Fire’s analysis of the file was categorized as malware, see Figures 96-98. There are 
several behaviors that do not apply to BIOS installation package, e.g. backdoor be-
havior (listening to a specific port), creates hidden executable in the Windows and 
Windows system folder, removes itself and visited a malware domain. 
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FIGURE 96. Backdoor behavior analyzed by WildFire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 97. Network activity of identified backdoor by WildFire 
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FIGURE 98.  Registry modifications by identified backdoor by WildFire 
 
36 out of 44 AV vendors detected this backdoor after being 1 week and 2 days in the 
Virustotal’s database. When queried again at 30th August 2013, the same detection 
ratio still exists, being 2 weeks and 3 days in Virustotal’s database (Figure 99-100). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 99. Virustotal’s detection ratio for a given sample at 22th Aug 2013 
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FIGURE 100. Virustotal’s detection ratio for a given sample at 30th Aug 2013 
 
If this many AntiVirus vendors can detect this specific backdoor so soon, within a 
week and two days, then it must have been seen within many customer’s networks 
globally. Usually different AntiVirus vendors do not detect malware this rapidly in 
web traffic. 
 
Predefined Reports and Custom Reports 
 
In addition to WildFire reports, the device itself generates predefined and custom 
reports defined by the administrator. An example of a predefined report is seen in 
Figure 101. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 101. Example of a Summary report scheduled by the device 
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Multiple predefined and custom reports can be scheduled to the email or viewed 
from the device itself. Figure 102 illustrates a data content report from the past 7 
days grouped by the application. On the right pane is the report list per category and 
below that is a list of different report categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 102. Reports viewed using the management interface. 
 
Traffic can be seen as a map where traffic sources or destinations are divided per 
countries, the color illustrates the risk and the size of the bubble illustrates the traffic 
amount, as seen in Figure 103. The Atlantic sea represents private addresses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 103. Traffic map for past 30 days for outgoing traffic 
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All reports are generated with active links and filters. Therefore choosing the traffic 
generated to Hong Kong in Figure 103, for example, will open up an Application 
Command Center illustrated in Figure 104-105. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 104. Traffic map filtered for Hong Kong for past 30 days 
 
Any of the blue colored texts are links to another filter, if more detailed filters are 
required. For example, selecting web-browsing in Figure 104 will add another filter 
based on web-browsing application in addition to existing filters, see Figure 105. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 105. Web-browsing traffic filtered for Hong Kong for past 30 days 
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Traffic Map and Threat Map can be used in the similar way or in the Traffic Monitor 
or Threat Monitor view, as illustrated in Figure 106. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 106. Threat Monitor for the past 30 days for top 10 threats 
 
Once again, by selecting a threat it works as an active filter to the next view, where 
traffic is filtered with a selected threat type, like a User Authenticated Brute-force 
Attempt in this case. That kind of threats occurred during several days and on Tues-
day, September 5th it occurred 41,970 of times. A similar figure as Figure 104-105 will 
appear, but as filter set to User Authenticated Brute-force Attempt and on Tuesday 
5th September. 
 
Browser based web applications can be separated as well, as illustrated in Figure 
107. All of these applications use either port 80 known as HTTP or dynamically allo-
cated port or port range or port hopping; however their behavior reveals the true 
application behind the traffic. 
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FIGURE 107. HTTP-Applications separated from the browser based traffic 
 
Sometimes it is convenient to compare traffic behavior between two timelines, tak-
ing for example this Monday to last week’s Monday or a certain day of the week or 
month to another day of the week or month. Figure 108 illustrates a change monitor 
for a given day. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 108. Change monitor for a Monday to previous Monday 
 
Change monitor offers a possibility to find behavior on certain days, if some troubles 
are experienced, e.g. larger traffic amounts or threats on a given day. Filter can be 
applied to as gainers, losers, applications, new or dropped traffic and so on. 
 
Many general reports are also available, like Top Categories and Top Denied Catego-
ries, illustrated in Figures 109 and 110. 
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FIGURE 109. URL Categories        FIGURE 110. Blocked URL Categories 
 
An example of custom report is illustrated in Figure 111. There is a list of viruses and 
spyware for the past week. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 111. A list of viruses and spyware for the past week grouped by application 
4.3.12 Custom Applications 
 
Sometimes it is necessary to write own customized applications for unknown-TCP or 
-UDP traffic that cannot be recognized. Alternatively, a packet capture can be made 
from the traffic and sent to the Palo Alto Networks to write an application identifica-
tion which is then updated via dynamic updates to all customers. A simple example 
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of a production environment in NCC of a web-based building automation system, 
built on an embedded system running on various version of Linux OS. The application 
was not recognized as web-browsing or similar application, instead unknown TCP 
traffic, which was blocked by default and only allowed applications were allowed. 
Therefore, a custom application was written with the following definition based on 
packed capture, as illustrated on Figures 112-115. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 112. Custom application example – Configuration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 113. Custom Application example – Advanced 
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FIGURE 114. Custom Application example – Signatures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 115. Custom Application example – Signatures for Session Scope 
 
In addition to custom application, Application Override Rule was also defined with 
correct zone, source, and destination definitions for desired ports. This way, the 
NGFW’s default application identification process can be ignored, since any custom 
made settings are prioritized first to run, prior to App-ID process. This way, any cus-
tom made applications are forced to be identified as custom applications. Now, Secu-
rity Rules can be made to this custom application for desired users or user groups. 
For this particular application, specific users were defined as sources. Then, a Custom 
URL Category was made with a Partner’s domain specifications in it. This was defined 
as a destination in the security rule and previously created custom application as 
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application with all the threat parameters on. The same example can be leveraged in 
BYOD solutions. This way security is not degraded, since this application override is 
done to an application that is known to be important for business. It is then exam-
ined, a custom application is written based on its behavior, source users are restrict-
ed to only need-to-know-basis, destination is limited to the specific domains only by 
custom category leveraging wildcards (in the format: *.company.com), only specific 
custom application is allowed and threat monitor is on with the same level as normal 
internet traffic for all users. 
 
4.3.13 Updates 
 
NGFW software was updated three times from 5.0.4 to 5.0.7. No errors were en-
countered with any features after the updates were applied, and everything worked 
normally. The software updates are illustrated in Figure 116. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 116. Software updates with NGFW 
 
Dynamic updates are checked daily and downloaded and installed whenever availa-
ble. Dynamic updates are illustrated in Figure 117. 
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FIGURE 117. Dynamic Updates using scheduling 
 
Global Protect software updates were also updated. They can be deployed automati-
cally to the client per every portal. Thus, internal users can be updated transparently 
and partners can be prompted to update the client. GP updates can be seen in Figure 
118. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 118. Global Protect version updates 
 
If agent updates for global protect client have been chosen to prompt for user, the 
following pop-up will occur next time the client connects to the portal, see Figure 
119. 
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FIGURE 119. Global protect client update 
 
All the updates reduces maintenance work, since no additional actions are needed 
from the administrators when something changes, e.g. software bugs are fixed and 
new applications or threats are identified. Customers can also receive updates from 
the Palo Alto Networks directly via email, when new applications features are added, 
removed or modified. This way, the administrator can verify that everything is in or-
der and know what will change during the next update without logging in to the sys-
tem. An example of content release notes is illustrated in Figure 120. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 120. Application and Threat Content Release Notes delivered via email 
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5 RESULTS 
 
The product and the remote access features are versatile and mature, based on the 
functional testing’s results. There has been product development in the past, since 
the previous SSL-VPN software called NetConnect is not supported anymore in the 
5.0 release. Instead, it is replaced and automatically migrated with Global Protect, 
which connects using a more efficient method: IPsec or as a fallback option: SSL. 
Whereas IPsec uses simpler and more efficient UDP, SSL uses slower but more relia-
ble TCP. All the SSL-VPN solutions, such as NetConnect, are based on SSL, even 
though some solutions may have additional transport methods included. 
 
Overall, a NGFW technology offers three different remote access solutions: 
 
 On-demand method, which is suitable for partners for occasional remote ac-
cess needs and mobile users for on-demand use. This type of connection can 
be established with any type of device that supports IPSec protocol without 
any additional license needs or with Global Protect Client with Global Protect 
License subscription. The use of Global Protect Clients together with IPSec cli-
ents can be combined also. Mobile devices can be laptops with Windows, 
Linux or Macintosh or they can be smartphones and tablets using Android, 
iOS or Windows8, with the exception that Windows8 is supported only with 
Global Protect Client. 
 User-logon method with Global Protect Client without the license subscrip-
tion in the portal. This method provides VPN Client functionality for laptops 
without the location awareness functionality which means that the IPSec 
tunnel is always performed regardless the location. IPSec clients are support-
ed with any IPSec-capable device 
 Pre-logon method with Global Protect Client with the license subscription in 
the portal. This method supports all the other methods mentioned above, but 
also the location awareness functionality with Global Protect Client in the lap-
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tops and mobile devices with Android and iOS (windows8 is not yet support-
ed, but other Windows versions are). It also enables the possibility to logon to 
the domain even the user is behind the remote access connection with win-
dows laptop and a valid machine certificate installed. 
 
Windows OS does not support IPSec termination other than Windows gateway prod-
ucts and therefore a separate VPN client program is required for terminating IPSec to 
other vendor’s gateways. This applies to all Windows platforms from Windows95 to 
Windows8, which means that it is probably a political decision that has driven to 
choose this path when developing windows OS. If the VPN gateway is other than 
Windows platform, a vendor specific VPN client software is recommended for full 
functionality and in Palo Alto NGFW case, VPN client program is Global Protect Client 
with or without the license. The mobile environment is not so mature yet, even it has 
grown rapidly for the past years. The consumerization may be one reason that re-
mote access functionalities have not been developed enough. The consumer does 
not need remote access outside working hours in their spare time, until they use it 
for work also. The immaturity can be seen in the devices capability to work reliably 
with platform provided IPSec client software, if it even exists. Windows8 OS is one 
example of immature VPN behavior, since it only supports windows based platforms 
and termination to other vendor’s gateways does not support windows specific ne-
gotiations or tunneling protocols, such as PPTP, L2TP, MS-CHAP etc. Another exam-
ple is Samsung Galaxy SII model, which native IPSec VPN client does not work at all, 
but the same family’s SIII and SIV models works without problem. Additional VPN 
Client software resolves this immaturity problem, but affects the wholeness if mobile 
environment is relying solely on device’s native IPSec client. 
 
Palo Alto Networks’ NGFW integrates many services and solutions, such as Proxy, AV, 
IDP/IPS and SSL-VPN into one, centralized solution. This enables many benefits which 
results in topological simplicity and greater visibility, and also less risks because of 
less complexity in the network topology. With an NGFW solution, latencies are 
smaller, since traffic does not need to be sent between several devices back and 
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forth in order to achieve the same functionality or result. Instead with purpose-built 
hardware and innovative technology solution, more efficiency and performance im-
provements can be achieved even with larger traffic amounts together with a num-
ber of different functionalities enabled. 
 
Global Protect solution offers features for remote access solutions for mid-sized and 
large companies, including branch offices. Remote access methods can be deployed 
as centralized solution or decentralized solution, depending on the geographical dis-
tribution of the company’s network and the size of the company. Several remote 
access methods are supported at the same time with different configurations ena-
bled for different level of zones or classification needs. Satellite configuration offer 
geographically distributed Global Protect gateways to the Global Protect clients. This 
way, connecting to the central site it always offers the best (or nearest) Global Pro-
tect gateway to choose from, or some additional gateways for stronger authentica-
tion needs of stricter security zone for certain users only, for example. Whenever a 
configuration changes, updated client software is available or a gateway is unavaila-
ble, the information is updated to the clients through the Global Protect Portal. 
 
Without a Global Protect Portal and Gateway license User-logon method is available 
with GP Client for laptops for Mac OS 32- and 64-bit and Windows OS 32- and 64-bit 
versions (Windows8 is not supported yet). In addition, 3rd party VPN is supported for 
any device that supports IPsec VPN with Xauth method, e.g. Android OS and Apple’s 
iOS. 3rd party VPN is typically used on-demand mode only, but Apple’s iOS supports 
also split tunneling with company domains routed through the VPN tunnel to the 
company network. In this scenario, VPN tunnel is established automatically but it 
supports certificate authentication only and therefore a user certificate is required 
and must be distributed to the clients prior to connection establishment. A company 
should carefully estimate whether to allow split tunneling, and if allowed, then con-
trol traffic with application identification and threat prevention. Split tunneling in-
troduces risks, since traffic can traverse from outside VPN connection, such as inter-
net, to the company network through the VPN tunnel. Therefore these risks need to 
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be addressed with minimal networks access and applications allowed, with maximal 
threat prevention and using need-to-know approach. 
 
With the Global Protect Portal and Gateway license, more features can be enabled. 
Laptops with GP Client installed recognize the internal network and the Internet and 
operate in a different manner, depending on the current location of the laptop. In 
the internal network, VPN is not established and when the location changes to the 
Internet the VPN is automatically established, without any user interaction if so con-
figured. Strong authentication can be implemented in this phase, if that is a pre-
ferred solution for the company. When connection is established automatically with 
license feature, strong authentication decreases the usability significantly, if user 
needs to authenticate with another PIN, SMS code or password. Instead, it should be 
done with a certificate or smartcard that requires user interaction only when insert-
ed or removed to or from the laptop. Alternatively, the additional authentication can 
be PIN code during boot-up and hibernate using encryption software, such as Bit-
locker in Windows. 
 
For smartphones and tablets, license feature enables the same functionality for GP 
Clients as with the laptops. GP Client is available for the most used platforms, which 
are Windows, Mac OS X, Android and iOS and its different functionalities operated 
very reliably during the test period, even with the built-in VPN configured in the de-
vices. For the mobile use, license features offer several ways of supporting remote 
access without at the sacrifice of the security and IT related risks, however it also 
support laptop usage with location awareness and different gateway selection op-
tions that offer extra redundancy for remote services if some of the gateways are 
unreachable. There is a feature that should be noted when using the GP license and 
full tunneling on the mobile device; this combination makes Bluetooth and WLAN 
tethering useless because full tunneling disables local network resources totally. This 
can be an advantage or disadvantage for a company, depending what is the current 
mobile policy in the company. If tethering using mobile device is currently used in the 
company to avoid use of malicious AP’s, then there is a conflict with full tunneling 
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feature in the mobile device and with the policy. One solution would be the use of 
available WLAN’s or additional SIM cards. 
 
WildFire functionality is a competitive advantage among competitors, since it anal-
yses unknown threats safely and in isolated environment separated from the cus-
tomer’s environment and provides detailed information about threats and behavior 
with integration to the Virustotal Database and its analyses. The traditional way of 
detecting viruses based on signatures has not been enough for several years any-
more, if used as only protection method. Also, layered protection protects better 
than traditional AV solution solely, but without behavioral analysis its significance is 
not enough anymore. Behavioral analysis with integrated cloud solution, consisting 
of virtual environments for Windows and Android including various set of office 
products and the most vulnerable software (such as Adobes Acrobat Reader) that 
analyses the viruses and creates the results in addition to existing countermeasures, 
is essential. Palo Alto Networks also have cooperation with Mandiant and Bit9 for 
make further use of WildFire information and WildFire itself operates in four time 
zones already. 
 
Palo Alton Networks provides various reports on-the-box by default, but also tailored 
reports using regex format via GUI or REST (Representational State Transfer) API in-
terface for external reporting systems to retrieve custom information from the 
NGFW directly. It simplifies reporting needs and gaining total network visibility by 
having as much information as possible in one location, whereas traditional systems 
retrieves or pushes pieces of information from various places of the network and 
then constructs the total network visibility by network monitoring, log and event 
management and SIEM systems. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Technology and architecture has a major part when choosing how to build a scalable, 
multifunctional and long-term solution in the infrastructure. A traditional way of im-
plementing the network solutions and services in the border of the network is com-
plicated in mid-sized and large deployments. NGFW solution will defeat many of 
those challenges since it simplifies the environment significantly and therefore ena-
bles the usage of modern solutions, such as BYODT, and adapts to business changes 
more efficiently. The architectural advantage of Palo Alto Networks’ NGFW is that 
the throughput is predictable in multi-gigabit speed with purpose-build hardware 
that has hardware acceleration in layers 4 to 7. The traditional solutions struggle 
when traffic increases and the outcome is usually low performance with varying la-
tencies and therefore the throughput is not predictable. This is, because the tradi-
tional technology is based on layer 4 architecture and layer 7 inspection is done with 
CPU on “industry standard hardware”. 
 
The new architectural model simplifies network topology by reducing the number of 
different devices and services by replacing them with NGFW’s own services. This also 
affects the following elements by lowering IT related costs depending how many ser-
vices are completely replaced: 
 
 Licenses and software: Security products’ licenses are based on number of 
clients or servers (AV’s, Proxies), end-user amount (AV’s, IPS) or simultaneous 
sessions (FW’s, Proxies) in the company  
 
 Management and reporting: Multi-vendor environment usually requires ven-
dor-specific management software and even licenses in some cases. Also, 
vendor-specific logging, alerting or reporting systems are sometimes needed 
to provide full support for the vendors’ features 
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 Multi-vendor environment and hardware: Services are typically added when 
needed and divided to different vendors because of various historical rea-
sons, such as gaining layered protection, dividing risks to different parties, or 
easier replacement of single service or functionality 
 
 Support and partner: By reducing partners, there are lesser contracts and 
supporting parties, but also lesser vendors, agreements and SLA’s. 
 
 Network visibility: Total network and security visibility is gained through one 
single solution or lesser solution, which reduces time spent in trouble-
shooting and finding root-causes, security issues and simplifies alerting and 
monitoring. 
 
NGFW solution carries one similar risk as traditional solution. If the firmware has a 
bug, a corruption of the configuration or some sort of fault condition, which causes 
some or all of the services work in an unexpected manner, then the faulty service or 
services affects the production significantly and may not be isolated at all until a fix is 
found by the vendor. In traditional architecture, this can be usually isolated from the 
network without the significant efforts and production can be continued without 
that service, however in the NGFW solution this isolation can be harder to achieve, 
depending on which service is the faulty one. Even if the device is in the cluster and 
connected through the high availability to the secondary device, the secondary de-
vice shares the same software and configuration information and does not provide a 
backup solution or fix to the firmware related risk. This kind of risk can be more likely 
when updating to the major firmware or software release and less likely when updat-
ing to the minor release. However, this kind of risk has not been encountered in the 
lifetime of Palo Alto Networks’ NGFW products since 2007 and the risk is also equal 
to the traditional based model’s risk. 
 
Traditional based model has many individual services (and usually even by different 
vendors) that form the wholeness and every clustered individual service carries the 
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same risk. Therefore, the risk can be even more likely realized since these individual 
services are cascaded, caused by the serial order processing and the network topolo-
gy. It is irrelevant to estimate what is the probability of the risk, since every services 
and vendors carries the same risk, but it is important to understand, that in the tradi-
tional model the risk is as many times more likely than the number of individual, cas-
caded services. Palo Alto Networks NGFW integrates all of those services into one 
cluster, but they still exist inside the device. Even all integrated services are consid-
ered the same risk and probability, at least the software that controls the integrated 
services is the same, there is only one vendor and processing is done in parallel or-
der, which all lower the overall risk of the wholeness. 
 
Employees and partners utilize more and more several different remote access 
methods at the same time. Therefore it is advantageous for the company to support 
as many remote access methods as possible to support varying business needs and 
devices. A company should not concentrate on limiting or denying the device models 
and platforms together with strict and complicated policies, instead, investing to the 
infrastructure that support standards and protocols and is a long-run solution would 
be advisable. 
 
6.1 Answering the Research Questions 
 
Do NGFW functionalities work as expected? 
 
All the tested functionalities operated as expected. However, one suspected bug was 
found in the Android platform for certain model of Samsung smartphone in the situa-
tion, where mobile client used a certificate installed to Android in order to authenti-
cate to the portal and gateway. This was verified in three times with the same result 
and the Tech Support File was created from the NGFW and the smartphone and a 
ticket was generated to the vendor. After testing the functionalities for six months, 
they worked very reliably all the time in all of the platforms and no other problems, 
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software freezes of bugs were found in the mobile devices or NGFW product. An im-
provement suggestion was also made to the vendor concerning Global Protect for 
Android in the situation described on page 59, Figure 22, to make the application 
permanently trusted instead of being asked to trust the application during every 
boot. 
 
Can traditional remote access and BYODT Technologies be supported with only one 
(logical) NGFW device? 
 
NGFW product used in this test with the Global Protect licenses will give much more 
comprehensive control methods for supporting different kinds of remote access 
methods including BYODT than a traditional one. This is only a technological solution, 
but it can support all the needed features for building up a secure remote access 
environment. All of this can be achieved with supporting different mobile platforms 
as long as the mobile platforms supports basic standards like IPsec VPN, but Global 
Protect Client is also available on several platforms. Upgrading from traditional solu-
tions to the NGFW solution is a long run investment for the infrastructure. 
 
Can the IT Environment be simplified using NGFW? 
 
Companies should carefully estimate what services they are running on their net-
work and what can be replaced with NGFW solution. After all, it is tempting to see 
how many services can be integrated into one and what hidden or indirect cost bene-
fits there are. Some of the benefits cannot be calculated, but are obvious, such as 
smaller latencies and faster trouble-shooting times. Benefits depend on the size of 
the company, since larger enterprises tend to have many solutions to do the same or 
similar tasks, and those tasks can be replaced ending up with a simpler environment. 
Replacement process will take time and after six months of switchover, most of the 
services are typically replaced and after a year, more and more fine-tuning can be 
achieved to gain more improvements to the monitoring of network and security 
events. 
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Can security still be measured and not degraded with NGFW? 
 
Many predefined reports are available and ready to run or schedule. Usually prede-
fined reports are not suitable or detailed enough for different kinds of environments 
and therefore custom reports are a must for any product to fulfill the needs of dif-
ferent requirements. Custom reports can be generated through the web GUI, but 
NGFW also supports API that can be used to produce almost any kind of information. 
The API interface can be used either to push or retrieve the information to or from 
NGFW. Overall, there are many possibilities to gain visibility to different level of sub-
jects from the information flow that travels through the NGFW. Also, customized 
alerts and external logging systems are supported to achieve better interoperability 
with external devices. 
 
6.2 Validity and Credibility of the Study 
In mid-sized and large companies distributing of applications, configurations, settings 
and updates have a significant role. Usually the devices are not similar, because of 
differences in the hardware, drivers, applications and the age of the OS and hard-
ware. Every time a change is made, there is a risk that the change affects some of the 
existing functionality. Therefore, it is vital to test changes for a test group of devices 
before distributing the changes to the rest of the devices. The functionality test of 
NGFW with only three different platforms and devices does not give any reliable per-
spective of the distribution phase. There can be bugs in the same platforms but with 
different hardware than what was revealed in this functionality test of this study. 
There are also many dependencies in the corporate environment between systems 
that need to be carefully estimated before considering changing the remote access 
methods and configurations. Tests, results and assumptions in the thesis do not ap-
ply to any other vendors’ NGFW product, since Palo Alto Networks’ architecture dif-
fers from the other vendors’ architecture significantly. 
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6.3 Areas for Further Research 
 
Palo Alto Networks will introduce PAN-OS version 6.0 at the 4th quarter of 2013, 
which will introduce more enhancements to the GP features and the NGFW itself. 
WildFire began to support Android packages officially in September 2013. By inspect-
ing Android Application Packages; .apk’s, NGFW supports more security visibility and 
reduces mobile risks, since Android is considered the riskiest mobile platform among 
the other mobile platforms at the moment (F-secure 2012, 8; F-secure 2013, 8). This 
is because of the open application platform strategy, whereas Apple’s strategy is 
more controlled and is therefore considered more trustworthy. 
 
In addition of supporting Android packages, other file types supported will be Mi-
crosoft Office documents; .doc, .xls, .ppt, Portable Document Format; .pdf and Java 
Archives; .jar. New features will be available for the customers starting at version 6.0. 
However, these new file types requires WildFire subscription (license) in the firewall, 
in order it to forward the files to the WildFire Cloud. Otherwise the FireWall only 
forwards the PE (Portable Executable) file formats to the cloud, e.g. .cpl, .exe, .dll. 
WildFire also enables incorrect verdict option for customers to sublimit to the Wild-
Fire Cloud, when they suspect that the sample is False Positive or False Negative. 
Palo Alto Networks’ Threat Team will perform a further analysis on the sample to 
determine should it be re-classified in the AntiVirus profile, for example. The cus-
tomer (submitter) will be always informed the results of the analysis. WildFire Analy-
sis Reports can be downloaded directly from the NGFW’s GUI. It includes the infor-
mation of dynamic analysis of each virtual machine where the sample was analyzed. 
Packet captures generated by the sample file in the WildFire virtual environment can 
be also downloaded in the GUI. When upgrading to version 6.0, license upgrade of 
WildFire Subscription will be recommended for the companies using mobile devices 
and remote access connections for better addressing risks in the mobile environ-
ment. 
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Version 6.0 also introduces DNS Sinkholing and Extended Packet Capturing features. 
When a computer is connected inside a company network and wants to communi-
cate with servers, it uses company’s DNS servers, which converts host names to the 
valid IP addresses. The IP address is then forwarded to the client, which then estab-
lishes a direct connection to the server’s IP address. This way, all the DNS queries are 
originated from the company’s DNS servers. This is the reason, why all the other DNS 
queries are typically denied in the FireWall. But the problem is that FireWall only 
sees DNS queries coming from the company’s DNS servers and not which client was 
the one that the DNS query was originated from. DNS Sinkholing feature address this 
problem by forging a response to the DNS query for a known malicious domain. This 
way the malicious domain name will be resolved to the administrator defined IP ad-
dress and enables to identify possibly infected clients in the protected network using 
DNS traffic, even the FireWall cannot see the client’s DNS queries. This administrator 
configured IP address is called Sinkhole IP address and can be used to detect possibly 
infected clients and identified in the traffic reports also. 
 
DNS Sinkholing can be enabled in the existing profiles and so can Extended Packet 
Capture feature also. It enables to capture automatically more than just the first 
packet of the configured trigger. By default it is set to 5 packets, but can be config-
ured from 1 to 50 packets to provide more content in the logs. This is a global setting 
which will affect to all packet capture settings that are defined to use extended mode 
in the NGFW’s Security Profiles. 
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